


















































































F FR RO OM M   S ST TA AT TE E   T TO O   M MA AR RK KE ET T: :
   
A A    S SU UR RV VE EY Y    O OF F    E EM M P PI I R RI I C CA AL L    S ST TU UD DI I E ES S   
O ON N    P PR RI I V VA AT TI I Z ZA AT TI I O ON N   FROM STATE TO MARKET:  






William L. Megginson  
Professor & Rainbolt Chair in Finance 
Michael F. Price College of Business 
The University of Oklahoma  
and  
Jeffry M. Netter 
Professor of Finance and Adjunct Professor of Law 
Terry College of Business 




This paper was developed with financial support from the SBF Bourse de Paris and the New York 
Stock Exchange, and the assistance of George Sofianos, Bill Tschirhart, and Didier Davidoff is 
gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate comments received on this paper from Anthony 
Boardman, Bernardo Bortolotti, Narjess Boubakri, Jean -Claude Cosset, Kathy Dewenter, 
Alexander Dyck, Ivan Ivanov, Ranko Jelic, Claude Laurin, Marc Lipson, Luis Lopez -Calva, John 
McMillan (the editor), Harold Mulherin, Rob Nash, John Nellis, David Newbe rry, David Parker, 
Enrico Perotti, Annette Poulsen, Ravi Ramamurti, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Nemat Shafik, Mary 
Shirley, Aidan Vining and three anonymous referees. Additionally, we appreciate comments 
received from participants at the NYSE/Paris Bourse Global  Equity Markets conference (Paris, 
December 1998), the Harvard Institute for International Development Privatization Workshop 
(June 2000), the International Federation of Stock Exchanges’ Third Global Emerging Markets 
Conference (Istanbul, April 2000), four  World Bank and/or International Finance Corporation 
meetings, two OECD conferences (Paris and Beijing), the 1999 Conference on Privatization and 
the Kuwaiti Economy in the Next Century, the 1998 Financial Management Association meeting, 
the 1999 European  Financial Management Association meeting, the Fondazione ENI Enrico 
Mattei (FFEM), the Swiss Banking Institute and Credit Suisse, and seminars at the City 
University Business School (London), London Guildhall University and the University of 
Oklahoma. All  remaining errors are the authors’ alone. Please address correspondence to:  
 
William L. Megginson 
Price College of Business 
307 West Brooks, 205A Adams Hall 
The University of Oklahoma  
Norman, OK 73019-4005 
Tel: (405) 325-2058; Fax: (405) 325-1957 
e-mail:  wmegginson@ou.edu  
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/M/William.L.Megginson-1  
 
This paper is forthcoming in the  Journal of Economic Literature (JEL).   1
From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization 
 
1. Introduction 
The political and economic policy of privatization, broadly defined as the deliberate sale by a 
government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private economic agents, is now in use 
worldwide. Since its introduction by Britain’s Thatcher government in the early 1980s to a then-
skeptical public (that included many economists), privatization now appears to be accepted as a 
legitimate – often a core — tool of statecraft by governments of more than 100 countries. 
Privatization is one of the most important elements of the continuing global phenomenon of the 
increasing use of markets to allocate resources. 
It is tempting to point to the spread of privatization programs around the world during the 
past two decades and conclude that the debate on the economic and political merits of government 
versus private ownership has been decided. But such a conclusion is flawed since twenty years ago 
proponents of state ownership could just as easily have surveyed the postwar rise of state-owned 
enterprises and concluded that their model of economic organization was winning the intellectual 
battle with free market capitalism. Instead of pointing to the spread of privatization and calling it 
destiny, our goal is to assess the findings of empirical research on the effects of privatization as a 
policy. Therefore, this paper surveys the rapidly growing literature on privatization, attempts to frame 
and answer the key questions this stream of research has addressed, and then describes some of its 
lessons on the promise and perils of selling state-owned assets. Throughout this survey, we adopt the 
perspective of an advisor to a government policymaker who is wrestling with the practical problems 
of whether and how to implement a privatization program. The policymaker asks “What does the 
research literature have to tell us about these aspects of privatization as an economic policy?” We 
attempt to answer these important questions. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical overview of 
privatization. We examine the impact that privatization programs have had in reversing SOE 
involvement in the economic life of developed and developing countries. Section 3 briefly surveys the 
recent theoretical and empirical research on the relative economic performance of state-owned and 
privately owned firms. Section 4 details the different types of transactions that are labeled 
“privatization” in different regions. We draw particular attention to the structure and pricing selected 
for share issue privatizations. We also evaluate the various forms of “voucher” or “mass”   2
privatizations that have been implemented. This section also examines whether less radical methods of 
improving the performance of SOEs, such as deregulation and allowing greater competition (or more 
routine steps such as using management performance contracts), can effectively substitute for outright 
privatization. In Section 5, we examine the issue of whether, and by how much, privatization 
programs have actually improved the economic and financial performance of divested firms. Our 
discussion first evaluates privatization in industrialized and developing countries, and then assesses 
privatization’s overall impact in the transition economies. Section 6 asks whether domestic and 
international investors who purchase privatizing share offerings experience positive initial and long-
term investment returns, and Section 7 evaluates the impact of privatization on the development of 
non-US capital markets over the past two decades. Finally, Section 8 discusses how privatization 
programs have impacted the development of—and interest in—corporate governance practices 
around the world. Section 9 concludes and summarizes our survey. 
 
2. How Large Has the Impact of Privatization Been to Date? 
Given the attention the press has given to the global movement toward markets, especially the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, some might conclude that privatization has almost ended the 
involvement of state-owned enterprises in global economic activity.
1 This is a significant 
overstatement. To understand the impact of privatization on the state’s role in different economies, 
we must first briefly review the history behind both privatization and its precursor, nationalization. 
Throughout history, there has been a mixture of public (often including religious institutions) 
and private ownership of the means of production and commerce. Sobel (1999) writes that state 
ownership of the means of production, including mills and metal working, was common in the ancient 
Near East, while private ownership was more common in trading and money lending. In ancient 
Greece, the government owned the land, forests, and mines, but contracted out the work to 
individuals and firms. In the Ch'in dynasty of China, the government had monopolies on salt and iron. 
Sobel notes that in the Roman Republic the "publicani (private individuals and companies) fulfilled 
virtually all the of the state's economic requirements." Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) note that by the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, we will use the World Bank’s definition of state-owned enterprises, as described 
in Haggarty and Shirley (1995): “government-owned or government-controlled economic entities that generate the 
bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services.”   3
time of the Industrial Revolution in the western industrialized societies and their colonies, the private 
sector was the most important producer of commercial goods and was also important in providing 
public goods and services. This pattern, with more government involvement in some countries and 
less in others, continued into the twentieth century in both Western Europe and its colonies and 
former colonies. In the United States, there was less government involvement than many other 
countries.  
The Depression, World War II, and the final breakup of colonial empires pushed government 
into a more active role, including ownership of production and provision of all types of goods and 
services, in much of the world. In Western Europe, governments debated how deeply involved the 
national government should be in regulating the national economy and which industrial sectors should 
be reserved exclusively for state ownership. Until the Thatcher government came to power in 1979, 
the answer to this debate in the U.K and elsewhere was that the government should at least own the 
telecommunications and postal services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of non-road 
transportation (especially airlines and railroads). Many politicians also believed the state should 
control certain “strategic” manufacturing industries, such as steel and defense production. In many 
countries, state-owned banks were also given either monopoly or protected positions, as discussed in 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000a).  
Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) argue that government ownership grew in the developing world 
for slightly different reasons, primarily that government ownership was perceived as necessary to 
promote growth. In the post-colonial countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, governments 
sought rapid growth through heavy investment in physical facilities. Another reason for government 
ownership, often through nationalization, was a historical resentment of the foreigners who had 
owned many of the largest firms in these countries [see also Noll (2000)].  
Thus, there had been a tremendous growth in the use of SOEs throughout much of the world, 
especially after World War II, which in turn led to privatizations several decades later.
2 Most people 
associate modern privatization programs with Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, which 
came to power in Great Britain in 1979. However, the Adenauer government in the Federal Republic 
                                                 
2 The historical overview of postwar privatizations is based on a longer historical discussion in 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994). Other discussions of the historical evolution of privatization 
include Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), Shirley and Nellis (1991), Haggarty and Shirley (1995), Brada (1996), 
Bennell (1997), and Yergin and Stanislaw (1998).   4
of Germany launched the first large-scale, ideologically motivated "denationalization" program of the 
postwar era. In 1961, the German government sold a majority stake in Volkswagen in a public share 
offering heavily weighted in favor of small investors.
3 Four years later, the government launched an 
even larger offering for shares in VEBA. Both offerings were initially received favorably, but the 
appeal of share ownership did not survive the first cyclical downturn in stock prices, and the 
government was forced to bail out many small shareholders. It was almost twenty years before 
another major western nation chose to pursue privatization as a core economic or political policy.
4  
Although the Thatcher government may not have been the first to launch a large privatization 
program, it is without question the most important historically. Privatization was not a major 
campaign theme for the Tories in 1979, but the new Conservative government embraced the policy. 
Margaret Thatcher adopted the label “privatization” which was originally coined by Peter Drucker 
and which replaced the name denationalization (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998, 114).”
5 Early sales were 
strenuously attacked by the Labour opposition, which promised that if it were reelected it would to 
renationalize divested firms such as British Aerospace and Cable and Wireless.
6  
It was not until the successful British Telecom initial public offering in November 1984 that 
privatization became established as a basic economic policy in the UK. A series of increasingly 
                                                 
3  Using a broader definition of privatization – one that encompassed reactively changing the policies of an 
immediate predecessor government – the Churchill government’s denationalization of the British steel industry 
during the early 1950s could well be labeled the first “privatization.” We thank David Parker for pointing this out 
to us. 
4 Yotopoulos (1989) describes and assesses the Chilean programs, which began before the program in the 
UK. The Pinochet government of Chile, which gained power after the ouster of Salvador Allende in 1973, 
attempted to privatize companies that the Allende government had nationalized. However, the process was poorly 
executed and required very little equity investment from purchasers of assets being divested. Thus, many of these 
same firms were re-nationalized once Chile entered its debt and payments crisis in the early 1980s. Chile’s second 
privatization program, which was launched in the mid-1980s and relied more on public share offerings than direct 
asset sales (in which the government often acted as creditor as well as seller) was much more successful.  
5 Anyone working in this area will soon notice that the last three syllables of “privatization” are 
sometimes spelled with an “s” and sometimes with a “z,” with the former generally being used by British writers 
and the latter by most everyone else. Although equity perhaps suggests that the nation which popularized the 
policy should get the honor of mandating its spelling, empirical evidence suggests the z-spelling is winning out. 
Of the 106 articles in our reference list with either privatization or privatisation in their titles, 96 use “z” while 10 
use “s”. 
6  Ironically, a Labour government partially privatized a SOE just before Thatcher came to power. In 
1977, the Labour government sold a relatively small fraction of the government’s shares in British Petroleum as a 
means of raising cash.   5
massive share issue privatizations (SIPs) during the last half of the 1980s and early 1990s reduced the 
role of SOEs in the British economy to essentially nothing after the Tories left office in 1997, from 
more than 10 percent of GDP 18 years earlier. 
We note that the objectives set for the British privatization program by the Conservatives 
were virtually the same as those listed by the Adenauer government twenty years before—and almost 
every government in the years since. These goals, as described in Price Waterhouse (1989a, b), are to 
(1) raise revenue for the state, (2) promote economic efficiency, (3) reduce government interference 
in the economy, (4) promote wider share ownership, (5) provide the opportunity to introduce 
competition, and (6) subject SOEs to market discipline. The other major objective mentioned by the 
Thatcher and subsequent governments is to develop the national capital market.
7 We note these goals 
can be conflicting and we discuss the tradeoffs further in the paper.  
The perceived success of the British privatization program helped persuade many other 
industrialized countries to begin divesting SOEs through public share offerings. Jacques Chirac’s 
government, which came to power in France in 1986, privatized 22 companies (worth $12 billion) 
before being ousted in 1988. The returning Socialist government did not execute any further sales, but 
neither did it renationalize the divested firms. Beginning in 1993, the Balladur government launched a 
new and even larger French privatization program, which has continued under the Jospin 
administration. The Socialists, in fact, launched the two largest French privatizations ever, the $7.1 
billion France Telecom initial public offering (IPO) in October 1997 and the subsequent $10.5 billion 
seasoned France Telecom issue in November 1998.  
Several other European governments, including Italy, Germany, and, most spectacularly, 
Spain, also launched large privatization programs during the 1990s. These programs typically relied 
on public share offerings, and were often launched by avowedly socialist governments. Privatization 
spread to the Pacific Rim, beginning in the late 1980s. Japan has sold only a relative handful of SOEs 
during the past 15 years (usually relying on SIPs), but many of these have been truly enormous. The 
three Nippon Telegraph and Telephone share offerings executed between February 1987 and October 
1988 raised almost $80 billion, and the $40 billion NTT offer in November 1987 remains the largest 
single security offering in history. Elsewhere in Asia, governments have taken an opportunistic 
                                                 
7 For more detailed discussions of the goals of the British privatization program, see Menyah, Paudyal, 
and Inganyete (1995) and Menyah and Paudyal (1996).   6
approach to SOE divestment, selling pieces of large companies when market conditions are attractive, 
or when money is needed to plug budget deficits. It is unclear how the economic difficulties that 
gripped the region during the late 1990s will impact privatizations in the future. 
Two Asian countries deserve special attention. These two countries are already the world’s 
second and fifth largest economies on a purchasing-power-parity basis, and promise to become even 
more important over time. The People’s Republic of China launched a major economic reform and 
liberalization program in the late-1970s that has transformed the productivity of the Chinese 
economy. While there have been numerous small privatizations, there have been relatively few 
outright sales of SOEs, thus the overall impact of privatization has been limited. Though the 
government recently (1999) reaffirmed its commitment to privatizing all but the very largest state 
enterprises, the fact that Chinese SOEs are burdened with so many social welfare responsibilities 
suggests that it will be extraordinarily difficult to implement a privatization program large enough to 
seriously undermine the state’s economic role (Lin, 2000, Lin, Cai, and Li, 1998, and  Bai, Li, and 
Wang, 1997). The other special Asian case is India, which adopted a major economic reform and 
liberalization program in 1991, after being wedded to state-directed economic development for the 
first 44 years of its independence. India’s reform program shares two key features with China’s: it 
was adopted in response to highly disappointing SOE performance (Majumdar, 1996), and 
privatization has thus far not figured prominently in the reform agenda. 
On the other hand, Latin America has truly embraced privatization. Chile’s program is 
particularly important, both because it was Latin America’s first and because the 1990 Telefonos de 
Chile privatization, which used a large American depository receipt (ADR) share tranche that was 
targeted towards U.S. investors, opened the first important pathway for developing countries to use 
to directly tap western capital markets.  
Mexico’s program was both vast in scope and remarkably successful at reducing the state’s 
role in what had been an interventionist economy. LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999) report that in 
1982 Mexican SOEs produced 14 percent of GDP, received net transfers and subsidies equal to 12.7 
percent of GDP, and accounted for 38 percent of fixed capital investment. By June 1992, the 
government had privatized 361 of its roughly 1,200 SOEs and the need for subsidies had been 
virtually eliminated.    7
Several other countries in Latin America have also executed large divestment programs 
(Gottret, 1999). For example, Bolivia’s innovative “capitalization” scheme has been widely acclaimed. 
However, the most important program in the region is Brazil’s. Given the size of Brazil’s economy 
and its privatization program, and the fact that the Cardoso government has been able to sell several 
very large SOEs (CVRD in 1997 and Telebras in 1998) in spite of significant political opposition, this 
country’s program is likely to remain very influential. 
Privatization in sub-Saharan Africa has been something of a stealth economic policy. Few 
governments have openly adopted an explicit SOE divestment strategy, but Bennell (1997) shows that 
there has been substantially more privatization in the region than is commonly believed.  For example, 
Jones et al. (1999) show that Nigeria has been one of the most frequent sellers of SOEs, using public 
share offerings. The experience of the African National Congress after it came to power in South 
Africa also shows the policy realities that governments with interventionist instincts face in this new 
era. Though nationalization and redistribution of wealth have been central planks of ANC ideology 
for decades, the Mandela and Mbeki governments have almost totally refrained from nationalizations, 
and have even sold off several SOEs (though use of the word “privatization” remains taboo).  
The last major region to adopt privatization programs comprised the former Soviet-bloc 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries began privatizing SOEs as part of a broader 
effort to transform themselves from command into market economies. Therefore, they faced the most 
difficult challenges and had the most restricted set of policy choices. After the collapse of communism 
in 1989-91, all of the newly elected governments of the region were under pressure to create 
something resembling a market economy as quickly as possible. However, political considerations 
essentially required these governments to significantly limit foreign purchases of divested assets.  
Since the region had little financial savings, these twin imperatives compelled many — though 
not all — governments throughout the region to launch “mass privatization” programs. These 
programs generally involved distributing vouchers to the population, which citizens could then use to 
bid for shares in companies being privatized. Although these programs resulted in a massive reduction 
of state ownership and the programs were (initially) popular politically, the net effects of these 
programs have been mostly disappointing. We discuss the empirical evidence on voucher privatization 
in Section 5.    8
Although different regions have embraced privatization at varying speeds, governments have 
found the lure of revenue from sales of SOEs to be attractive – which is one reason the policy has 
spread so rapidly. According to Privatisation International (Gibbon, 1998, 2000), the cumulative 
value of proceeds raised by privatizing governments exceeded $1 trillion sometime during the second 
half of 1999. As an added benefit, this revenue has come to governments without raising taxes or 
cutting other government services. Annual proceeds grew steadily before peaking at over $160 billion 
in 1997. Since then, proceeds seem to have leveled off at an annual rate of about $140 billion. Figure 
1 shows the annual revenues governments have received from privatizations from 1988 through 1999. 
Mahboobi (2000) reports similar figures classified by privatizations in OECD and non OECD 
countries. He reports that since 1990 privatization in OECD countries has raised over $600 billion, 
which is approximately 2/3 of global privatization activity. Western Europe has accounted for over 
half of these proceeds. (See figure #1) 
This historical discussion suggests that state ownership has been substantially reduced since 
1979, and in most countries this has in fact occurred. Using data from Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 
(1999), Figure 1 demonstrates the role of state-owned enterprises in the economies of high-income 
(industrialized) countries has declined significantly, from about 8.5 percent of GDP in 1984 to less 
than 6 percent in 1991. Data presented in Schmitz (1996), Nester and Mahboobi (1999), and 
Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (1999), as well as our own empirical work on share issue 
privatization, suggests that the SOE share of industrialized-country GDP has continued to decline 
since 1991, and is now probably below 5 percent.  
The low-income countries show an even more dramatic reduction in state ownership. From a 
high point of almost 16 percent of GDP, the average SOE share of national output dropped to barely 
7 percent in 1995, and has probably dropped to about 5 percent since then. The middle-income 
countries also experienced significant reductions in state ownership during the 1990s. Since the 
upper- and lower-middle-income groups include the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, this decline was expected given the extremely high beginning levels of state ownership. For 
example, Shafik (1995) reports that the Czechoslovakian government owned 98 percent of all 
property in 1989.  (See figure #2) 
 
   9
3. Why Have Governments Embraced Privatization Programs? 
3.1. The Efficiency of State Versus Private Ownership: Theory 
Throughout history, scholars, including economists, have debated the role of government in 
the economy.
8 Among economists, this debate now spans many areas including welfare economics, 
public choice, public finance, industrial organization, law and economics, corporate finance, and 
macroeconomics. In this section, we summarize some of the important theoretical issues that arise in 
the study of privatization and that are needed to analyze the empirical evidence we review in the rest 
of the paper. We concentrate on empirical evidence because, as Laffont and Tirole (1993) say at the 
end of their model analyzing tradeoffs between government and private ownership in promoting 
efficiency, “theory alone is thus unlikely to be conclusive in this respect.” There are also several 
excellent articles that discuss the theory of privatization and review the literature, including Boardman 
and Vining (1989), Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Sheifer (1998), 
Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999), Nellis (1999), Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999), and Shirley 
and Walsh (2000).  
The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the large literature on the economics of 
ownership and the role for government ownership (or regulation) of productive resources. An initial 
question to be asked is “what is the proper role of government?” Implicitly, we assume that the goal 
of government is to promote efficiency. Thus, we discuss the efficiency implications of government 
ownership and more importantly, the movement from government ownership to privatization. To a 
large extent we ignore the arguments concerning the importance of equitable concerns such as income 
distribution. We do so not because they are unimportant, but because they are beyond the scope of 
this review. The effects of privatization on productive efficiency, or at least observable variables that 
are proxies for productive efficiency, is the focus of most of the empirical literature we review here. 
The theoretical arguments for the advantages of private ownership of the means of production 
are based on a fundamental theorem of welfare economics: Under strong assumptions, a competitive 
equilibrium is pareto optimal. However, the assumptions include requirements that there are no 
                                                 
8  For example, Frederich von Hayek’s passionate critiques of the welfare state and collectivism, 
exemplified in the 1944 book The Road to Serfdom, had a direct impact on policymakers in developing a motive 
for privatization. Yergin and Stanislaw (1998, p. 98-107) write how Hayek’s work was the intellectual basis for 
Keith Joseph and then Margaret Thatcher and the Tory politicians who began the intellectual campaign against 
statism in the U.K. that triggered the worldwide privatization movement.    10
externalities in production or consumption, that the product is not a public good, that the market is 
not monopolistic in structure, and that information costs are low. Thus, a theoretical argument for 
government intervention based on efficiency grounds rests on an argument that markets have failed in 
some way, one or more of these assumptions do not hold, and that the government can resolve the 
market failure.  
Intellectual arguments for government intervention based on efficiency considerations have 
been made in many areas. Governments perceive the need to regulate (or own) natural monopolies or 
other monopolies, intervene in the case of externalities (such as regulating pollution), and help 
provide public goods (such as providing national defense and education, or in areas where there is a 
public good aspect to providing information). The arguments for government intervention become 
more complicated when they extend to distributional concerns. For example, some (e.g., Briggs, 
1961) argue that the role of government is to act as a “welfare state,” using state intervention in the 
market economy to modify the actions of the market.
9 Thus, the arguments for state ownership or 
control rest on some market failure or perceived market failure, and countries have often responded 
to market failure with state ownership. Privatization, in turn, is a response to the failings of state 
ownership. Theoretical arguments that have arisen in the privatization debate include: 
1) The impact of privatization depends on the degree of market failure. As noted, welfare 
theory (ignoring the theory of second best) would argue that privatization tends to have the greatest 
positive impact in those cases where the role for the government in lessening a market failure is the 
weakest, i.e., for SOEs in competitive markets, or markets that can become readily competitive. 
Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999), in summarizing the theoretical literature, argue that there should 
be “… important efficiency gains from changes to private ownership in competitive structures.” In 
fact, the effects of competition can be so strong that SOEs, in an increasingly global environment, 
may be forced to respond to pressures that maximize productive efficiency without the ownership 
change of privatization. (See Shirley and Walsh (2000) for additional discussion of the effects of 
competition on the privatization decision.) 
In contrast, the justification for privatization is less compelling in markets for public goods 
and natural monopolies where competitive considerations are weaker. However, even in those 
                                                 
9 Gough (1989) notes Archbishop Temple first used the term in wartime Britain to differentiate Britain 
from the “warfare” state of Nazi Germany.   11
markets, Shleifer (1999) and others have argued that government-owned firms are rarely the 
appropriate solution for many of the reasons discussed below.  
2) Contracting ability impacts the efficiency of state and private ownership. Government 
ownership of firms results in problems in defining the goals of the firm. While the shareholder-wealth-
maximizing model of corporate organization is becoming increasingly dominant in part because of the 
advantages of having a well-defined corporate goal (see Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000), 
governments have many objectives other than profit or shareholder-wealth maximization. Further, 
government objectives can change from one administration to the next. The inability of the 
government to credibly commit to a policy can significantly reduce the efficiency of a firm’s 
operations and governance. Even if the government does attempt to maximize social welfare, for 
example, welfare is a difficult thing to measure and use in guiding policy.
10  In addition, the 
government’s goals can be inconsistent with efficiency, inconsistent with maximizing social welfare, 
or even malevolent (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993 and Shleifer, 1999). 
In addition, even if the government and the nation's citizens agree that profit maximizing is the 
goal of the firm, it is difficult to write complete contracts that adequately tie managers' incentives to 
that goal. Shleifer (1999) argues that the owners of public firms (the nation’s citizens) are less able to 
write complete contracts with their managers because of their diffuse nature, making it difficult to tie 
the managers’ incentives to the returns from their decisions. This is a subset of the broader arguments 
based in property rights and agency costs that there will be differences in performance between 
government and privately held firms because there are a broader range of monitoring devices under 
private ownership.
11    
3) Ownership structure affects the ease with which government can intervene in the 
operations of a firm. Of course, governments can intervene in the operations of any firm, either public 
or private. However, the government’s transaction costs of intervening in production arrangements 
and other decisions of the firm are greater when firms are privately owned. Thus, to the extent that 
                                                 
10  Stiglitz (1998) provides an insightful analysis, based on personal experience, of the difficulty 
governments face in implementing pareto-efficient improvements due to information costs and the problems of 
commitment and dynamic bargaining. These arguments apply to both government regulation (the main case 
Stiglitz analyzes) and to state ownership.  
11  Alchain (1977) notes, “behavior under [public and private] ownership is different, not because the 
objectives sought by organizations under each form are different, but, instead, because even with the same explicit 
organization goals, the costs-rewards system impinging on the employees and the ‘owners’ of the organization are   12
government intervention has greater costs than benefits, private ownership is preferred to public 
ownership (see Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987).     
4) A major source of inefficiency in public firms stems from less-prosperous firms being 
allowed to rely on the government for funding, leading to “soft” budget constraints. The state is 
unlikely to allow a large SOE to face bankruptcy. Thus, the discipline enforced on private firms by the 
capital markets and the threat of financial distress is less important for state-owned firms. Kornai 
(1998, 1993), Berglof and Roland (1998), and Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) all 
suggest that soft budget constraints were a major source of inefficiency in Communist firms. They 
also note that supposedly “hard” budget constraints imposed by a government on SOEs are not very 
effective either.  
5) Privatization can impact efficiency through its effect on government fiscal conditions. As 
noted in Section 1, governments have raised huge amounts of money by selling SOEs. Such sales 
have helped reduce the fiscal deficit in many countries. Though important, examining the efficiency 
effects of reducing government deficits is beyond the scope of this paper. Davis, Ossowski, 
Richardson and Barnett (2000) show that privatization has significant positive effects on 
governments’ fiscal conditions.  
6) At a macroeconomic level, privatization can help develop product and security markets. 
One important motivation for privatization is to help develop factor and product markets, as well as 
security markets. As discussed above, welfare economics argues that efficiency is achieved through 
competitive markets. Thus, to the extent that privatization promotes competition, privatization can 
have important efficiency effects.  
Inevitably, the effectiveness of privatization programs and markets themselves are 
simultaneously determined. It has been clear in the transition economies that the success of the 
privatization program depends on the strength of the markets within the same country, and vice versa. 
Thus, the impact of privatization will differ across countries depending on the strength of the existing 
private sector. The empirical evidence shows that this is the case. 
3.2. Summary of the Theory of Privatization 
Theoretical work that examines privatization offers many reasons why, even in the case of 
market failure, state ownership has important weaknesses. Shleifer (1998) sums up much of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
different.”    13
literature with, “… a good government that wants to further ‘social goals,’ would rarely own 
producers to meet its objectives.” A question for the post-privatization world is the role of the public 
sector in the economy and in the regulation of firms. The alternative to state ownership is rarely 
purely private, unregulated firms. State ownership is only one form of the continuum of governance 
structures that reflect the level of state regulation of public and privately owned firms (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993). Many of the theoretical arguments for privatization are based on the premise that the 
harmful effects of state intervention have a greater impact under state ownership than under state 
regulation, not that the harmful effects can be eliminated through privatization. However, in this paper 
we leave to others the continuing debate on the proper role of regulation in a market-oriented 
economy. Instead, we analyze recent empirical literature examining the relative effectiveness of state 
versus private ownership.
12  
3.3. The Efficiency of State versus Private Ownership: Empirical Evidence 
Comparing the performance of government-owned to privately owned firms is one method 
through which the impact of government ownership on firm performance can be analyzed.
13  In section 
5 we present a more complete discussion of the potential problems in all empirical work in this area 
which includes lack of data and bad data, omitted variables, endogenity, and selection bias. There are 
two methodological difficulties that are especially pronounced in attempts to isolate the impact of 
ownership on performance. First, in comparing SOEs to privately owned firms, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the appropriate set of comparison firms or benchmarks, especially in 
developing economies with limited private sectors. Second, there are generally fundamental reasons 
why certain firms are government-owned and others are privately owned, including the degree of 
perceived market failure within the particular industry. These factors that determine whether the firm 
                                                 
12  The opinions of policymakers throughout the world have been moving closer to those expressed by 
Ronald Coase in his classic 1960 article, “The Problem of Social Cost.” In analyzing market failure, Coase says, 
“All solutions have costs, and there is no reason to suppose that governmental regulation is called for simply 
because the problem is not handled well by the market or the firm.” Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (1997) in a 
more recent analysis of the benefits and costs of free markets versus central planning say markets have worked 
better because, "First, the price system motivates better use of knowledge and information in economic decisions. 
Second, it provides stronger incentives for individuals to make productive decisions." 
13  A related literature that we do not review analyzes the relative performance of nonprofit firms and for-
profit firms. Brickley and Van Horn (2000), in an analysis of large hospitals, argue that the evidence suggests 
there is little distinction between the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Their results suggest the 
similarities in behavior are due to the effects of competition and not identical objective functions of the managers. 
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is publicly or privately owned likely also have significant effects on performance. Thus, it is difficult 
to evaluate the effects of government ownership in cases where the ownership structure is itself 
endogenous to the system that includes both political and performance goals. Despite these problems, 
researchers have compared SOEs and privately owned-firm performance in several cases with some 
success. We summarize the papers included here in Table 1. (See table #1) 
Given the above noted limitations, Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994) provide 
good evidence on productivity differences between state-owned and privately owned firms. They use 
a sample of 23 comparable international airlines of different (and in some cases changing) ownership 
categories over the period 1973-83 for which they are able to obtain good and comparable cost, 
output, and ownership data. They develop a model of endogenous, firm-specific productivity growth 
as a function of firm-specific capital and use the model as a basis for their fixed-effects regressions 
estimating a cost function in a simultaneous framework with input-demand equations. They argue that 
they are able to separate the impact of ownership changes on short-term levels of productivity 
changes from the long-term effects on the rate of productivity growth, improving on earlier studies 
that have concentrated on the static rather than dynamic effects of state ownership and changes in 
state ownership. Further, the authors suggest that they are able to isolate the effects of ownership 
from other factors impacting the rate of productivity growth, including market conditions and 
exogenous technical changes.  
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994) find a significant link between ownership 
and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. Their results suggest that private ownership leads to 
higher rates of productivity growth and declining costs in the long run and these differences are not 
affected by the degree of market competition or regulation. Their estimates suggest that the short-run 
effects of changes from state to private ownership on productivity and costs are ambiguous, providing 
a possible explanation for some of the anomalous results in studies examining short-run effects of 
ownership changes. However, their point estimates indicate that the change from complete state 
ownership to private ownership in the long run would increase productivity growth by 1.6 to 2 
percent a year and costs would decline by 1.7 to 1.9 percent. Their empirics also suggest that a partial 
change from state ownership to private ownership has little effect on long-run productivity growth -- 
the benefits are based on complete privatization of the firm.    15
This paper has advantages over much of the other work in the area due to the good data, as 
well as guidance from a well-developed literature in estimating the determinants of productivity. The 
authors perform some of the more sophisticated econometric analysis of papers in this area. For 
example, they replicate their results with a subset of firms that did not experience any within-firm 
changes in ownership, enabling the authors to be sure that their time-ownership interaction term 
captures only between firm variations in ownership. Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter also 
perform various other robustness checks using different specifications and subsamples as well as 
controlling for the special characteristics of their sample period (oil price shocks and deregulation in 
the U.S.), and find that their results are robust. Finally, they consider the potential for simultaneity 
effects between ownership and productivity and find that causality goes from ownership to 
productivity, and not vice versa. The weakness in the work is that it is based on one industry with 
relatively old data. The authors also note that they make the implicit assumption that all firms are cost 
minimizing, but if state-owned enterprises have other objectives, it is difficult to interpret the meaning 
of differences in costs.   
Majumdar (1996) examines differences in efficiency between government-owned, mixed, and 
private-sector firms in India. He finds support for the superior efficiency of private and mixed-sector 
firms over SOEs. Using aggregate, industry-level survey data, Majumdar finds that SOEs owned by 
the central and state governments have average efficiency scores of 0.658 and 0.638, respectively, 
over the period 1973-89. Mixed enterprises have scores of 0.92 and private enterprises have scores of 
0.975. A concern with Majumdar’s study is that the aggregated nature of the data, along with 
problems arising from the reliance on survey data, limits his ability to identify any specific areas where 
private versus state ownership works best, and whether there are simultaneity and selection bias 
problems in trying to estimate the effects of ownership and productivity. In addition, he can provide 
little insight into the reasons for the efficiency differences between the sectors.  
Tian (2000) offers another country-specific study. He examines 825 companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, with 513 mixed-ownership firms and 312 private firms. He finds that 
private firms perform better than mixed ownership firms. In addition, he examines the valuation of the 
companies and finds that corporate value with small government shareholdings decreases with the 
fraction of state shareholding but rises when the government is a large shareholder.    16
Another approach to studying the effects of government ownership on efficiency relies on a 
multi-industry, multinational, time-series methodology. While cross-sectional time series studies suffer 
from methodological problems we discuss later, they are able to capture differences that are not 
apparent in single country or single industry studies. An influential paper taking this approach is 
Boardman and Vining (1989) who examine the economic performance of the 500 largest non-U.S. 
industrial firms in 1983. Using four profitability ratios and two measures of X-efficiency, they show 
that state-owned and mixed (state and private) ownership enterprises are significantly less profitable 
and productive than are privately owned firms. They also find that mixed enterprises are no more 
profitable than SOEs, suggesting that full private control, not just partial ownership, is essential to 
achieving performance improvement. In a later study, Vining and Boardman (1992), use a sample of 
Canadian firms to re-examine the state versus private ownership question. Their results are 
qualitatively similar to the earlier findings. In addition, the Canadian study finds that mixed enterprises 
are more profitable than SOEs, though they fall far short of private-firm levels. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) follow the general approach of Boardman and Vining (1989) 
using more recent data. They test whether the profitability, labor intensity, and debt levels of SOEs in 
the 500 largest international companies, as reported in Fortune for 1975, 1985, and 1995, differ from 
privately owned firms in the same samples. Their data have 1,369 total firm years, of which 147 
represent government-owned firms. Since Fortune excluded U.S. firms until 1995, the data are mainly 
international. After controlling for firm size, location, industry, and business-cycle effects, Dewenter 
and Malatesta find robust evidence that private companies are significantly (often dramatically) more 
profitable than SOEs, and also have lower levels of indebtedness and fewer labor-intensive production 
processes than do their state-owned counterparts. 
Finally, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) compare the performance of 
privatized and state firms in the transition economies of Central Europe, and explicitly try to control 
for selection bias.
14  Using survey data for 506 midsize manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland in 1994, they compare four measures of firm performance – sales revenues, 
employment, labor productivity (revenue per employee) and material costs per unit of revenue. They 
compare the privatized group to the nonprivatized group with panel data, controlling for potential 
                                                 
14  Frydman et al. also compare the performance of the privatized firms to themselves as SOEs. Thus, we 
also discuss the paper in Section 5 and it is summarized in Table 5.    17
pre-privatization differences between the two groups. Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski find 
that the average effect of privatization is that it works – privatized firms perform better than the state 
owned firms. However, the performance improvement is concentrated in revenue improvement (not 
cost reduction) in firms privatized to outside owners. 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) make two important contributions. First, they 
show that while privatization improves performance, the effect is limited to certain measures of 
performance and in cases where the SOE is sold to outside owners. Second, they attempt to control 
for the effects of selection bias in examining the effects of privatization in several ways. First, they use 
a fixed effects model to control for selection bias caused by unobserved firm characteristics correlated 
with performance outcomes that are fixed over time. Further, they contrast the performance of firms 
privatized in one period with those privatized in another for two different time periods to compare the 
privatized firms with how they would have performed without privatization. Finally, to control 
partially for the possibility that better firms are selected for privatization, they contrast the pre-
privatization performance of managerially controlled firms with those controlled by other owners. 
Thus, the paper does an excellent job of controlling for potential biases, though it necessarily depends 
on survey data. 
We conclude this section with two studies that use unique situations to analyze the effects of 
government versus private ownership. Kole and Mulherin (1997) set out to answer the basic question 
in the public versus private debate as posed by Peltzman (1971), “If a privately owned firm is 
socialized, and nothing else happens, how will the ownership alone affect the firm’s behavior.” Kole 
and Mulherin study 17 firms with significant German or Japanese ownership when the U.S. entered 
World War II. The U.S. government assumed ownership of the foreign stock in these firms and ended 
up holding between 35 and 100 percent of the common stock for up to 23 years during and after 
World War II. Kole and Mulherin find industry controls for five firms, comprising 61 percent of the 
book value of the 17 firms, and compare the performance of the government-owned firms. They find 
no significant difference between the performance of their sample with the private-sector firms and 
state “the preceding results stand in contrast to the typical results regarding the inefficiency of 
government enterprise.” The authors argue that the fact that these firms were operating in competitive 
industries forced them to operate efficiently.    18
The Kole and Mulherin (1997) results are evidence that in a competitive environment, where 
the government has no agenda other than as a passive investor, factors other than ownership 
determine firm performance. Many of the firms were involved in the war effort so the government had 
an incentive to run them efficiently. In addition, all the firms were eventually reprivatized so the 
government was also concerned with running the firms efficiently to maximize the later sale value. 
Kole and Mulherin admit that their sample and the period they study is novel, limiting its generality. 
Further, their results are based on only five firms. Still, their findings do illustrate the importance of 
factors other than ownership in determining firm performance 
Another paper takes a very interesting natural experiment to compare the performance of 
government-organized versus privately organized production. Karpoff (2000) studies 35 government- 
and 56 privately-funded expeditions to the Arctic from 1818 to 1909 seeking to locate and navigate a 
Northwest Passage, discover the North Pole, and make other discoveries in arctic regions. He finds 
that the private expeditions performed better using several measure of performance. Karpoff shows 
most major arctic discoveries were made by private expeditions, while most tragedies (lost ships and 
lives) were on publicly funded expeditions. Karpoff also estimates regressions explaining outcomes in 
several ways (crew deaths, ships lost, tonnage of ships lost, incidence of scurvy, level of expedition 
accomplishment), controlling for exploratory objectives sought, country of origin, the leader's 
previous arctic experience, or the decade in which the expedition occurred. In essentially every 
regression, the dummy variable for private expedition is significant with a sign indicating that the 
private expedition performed better. Karpoff concludes that the incentives were better aligned in the 
private expeditions, leading to systematic differences in the ways public and private expeditions were 
organized. Again, the uniqueness of the sample limits its generality. Further, the government-funded 
expeditions tended to be earlier than the private expeditions, suggesting the endogeneity of the 
funding decision to the riskiness of the expedition. However, Karpoff provides an interesting 
illustration of the impact of ownership on the performance of an organization. 
15 
3.4. Are there policy alternatives to privatization? 
As discussed earlier, some argue that competition and deregulation are more important than 
privatization in improving performance of firms (Yarrow, 1986, Kay and Thompson, 1986, Vernon-
                                                 
15  Olds (1994) also uses data from the 1800s to show that after the privatization of the tax supported 
Congregationalist churches in New England demand for preachers and church membership rose dramatically.   19
Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989, Bishop and Kay, 1989, Vickers and Yarrow, 1991, and Bardhan and 
Roemer, 1992). Others maintain that privatization is necessary for significant performance 
improvements (Vining and Boardman, 1992, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994, 1996, Nellis, 1994, 
Brada, 1996, and Shleifer, 1998) [see Nellis (1999) for the best synthesis of the empirical arguments 
on this question]. Although much of this debate is outside the scope of this paper, there are a few 
empirical studies that examine countries where economic reform has been implemented instead of, or 
prior to, full privatization.
16   
Pinto, Belka, and Krajewsk (1993) examine the way in which the Polish state sector 
responded in the three years following Poland’s “Big Bang” reforms of January 1990. These reforms 
deregulated prices, introduced foreign competition to many industries, and signaled that tight 
monetary and fiscal policies would be pursued. However, the Polish government did not immediately 
launch a large-scale privatization program. The authors document significant performance 
improvements on the part of most manufacturing firms. They conclude that these improvements were 
due to the imposition of hard budget constraints reinforced by tighter bank lending behavior, 
consistency in the government’s “no bailout signal,” import competition, and reputational concerns by 
SOE managers. 
Potentially the best way to improve performance in SOEs is the use of incentive contracts for 
management and workers to improve the performance of the firms (Jones, 1991). The World Bank 
endorsed these contracts in the 1980s. China has undergone widespread economic reform with 
minimal privatization through the use of these incentive contracts and offers a natural setting in which 
to study their impact. 
Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1995) discuss the ways in which incentives were 
added to the Chinese managerial labor market by the late 1980s, including replacement after poor 
performance and the linking of managerial pay to profits. Further, managers were selected by 
auctions, where the auction process revealed information about the managers that in a market 
economy could have come from observations of the performance of the manager. Groves, Hong, 
McMillan, and Naughton (1994) show that after 1978, when Chinese firms were given more 
                                                 
16  Majumdar (1996) also suggests that reform can improve SOE performance by showing that the gap 
between the private and public firms’ performance partly closes during those periods when governments are 
pushing reform agendas.   20
autonomy and were allowed to retain more of their profits and to increase workers’ incentives 
through bonus payments and differing work contracts, there were increases in workers’ incomes 
(thought not of managers) and additional investment in the firms.  
Li (1997) documents marked improvements in the marginal and total factor productivity of 
272 Chinese SOE over the period 1980-89 as a result of economic reforms in China, including the 
increased use of incentives. He finds evidence of substantial increases in productivity over the reform 
period, much of which can be attributed to the reform. In addition, his evidence suggest that 87 
percent of the growth in productivity was due to improved incentives and compensation. Li notes, 
however, the potential for selection bias in his study both in the firms selected for the survey and in 
the responses to the survey.  
Shirley and Xu (1998) come to the opposite conclusion concerning the ability of incentive 
contracts to improve firm performance. They analyze the effects of these contracts in 12 monopoly 
SOEs. They find that the incentive contracts have no effect on profitability or labor productivity, and 
they find some evidence of negative effects on growth in total factor productivity. They attribute the 
failure of the contracts to the inability of the governments to follow through on promised actions and 
to the inability of supervisory agencies to negotiate and monitor the contracts in an effective manner. 
It must be noted, however, that the study is based on a small sample size, limiting the ability to draw 
conclusions from its results, especially in light of the evidence from the studies of Chinese firms. 
The evidence from China suggests that enterprise restructuring, concentrating on improving 
the allocation of property rights and incentives, can yield large benefits even without privatization.
17  
Naturally, this begs the question whether economic reform coupled with privatization could lead to 
even greater performance improvements. Unfortunately, this is little evidence on this question and it 
would be difficult to develop any evidence on it. Note also that the evidence on the benefits of reform 
without privatization comes primarily from one country where country-specific factors may play an 
important but unidentified role. One thing we can say is that, as we note later in the paper, the 
evidence demonstrating the benefits of privatization is weakest for countries in Eastern Europe, where 
privatization was implemented rapidly. This may suggest that privatization should have proceeded 
along a more gradual path. We address that question later on. 
                                                 
17  This is consistent with the findings of Brickley and VanHorn (2000) that the managers of non-profit 
hospitals face similar incentives to the managers of for profit hospitals and behave in a similar manner.     21
4. How Do Countries Privatize? Methods of Selling State-Owned Assets 
A key decision to be made by the privatizing government is the method through which the 
state-owned asset is transferred to private ownership. This decision is difficult because, in addition to 
the economic factors such as valuing the assets, privatizations are generally part of an ongoing, highly 
politicized process. Some of the factors that influence the privatization method include: (1) the history 
of the asset’s ownership, (2) the financial and competitive position of the SOE, (3) the government’s 
ideological view of markets and regulation, (3) the past, present, and potential future regulatory 
structure in the country, (4) the need to pay off important interest groups in the privatization, (5) the 
government’s ability to credibly commit itself to respect investors’ property rights after divestiture, 
(6) the capital market conditions and existing institutional framework for corporate governance in the 
country, (7) the sophistication of potential investors, and, (8) the government’s willingness to let 
foreigners own divested assets. 
The complexity of the goals of the process means that different countries have used many 
different methods for privatizing many different types of assets. Although financial economists have 
learned much about selling assets in well-developed capital markets, we still have a limited 
understanding of the determinants and the implications of the privatization method for state-owned 
assets. Theoreticians have modeled some aspects of the privatization process, but to be tractable, their 
models must ignore important factors. Empirical evidence on the determinants of privatization is also 
limited by the complexity of the goals of the privatization process  
4.1. Methods of Privatization 
Brada (1996) presents an excellent taxonomy of privatization methods. Although the context 
of his paper is Central and Eastern Europe, his classification of four principal divestment methods is 
quite general. In addition, he provides a review of the successes and failures of each of these general 
approaches in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, there are many variations within each of his 
four categories and Brada shows that many privatizations use combinations of the different types of 
privatization.  
Brada's first category is privatization through restitution. This method is appropriate when 
land or other easily identifiable property that was expropriated in years past can be returned to either 
the original owner or to his or her heirs. This form of privatization is rarely observed outside of 
Eastern Europe, though it has been important there. For example, Brada (1996) reports that up to 10   22
percent of the value of state property in the Czech Republic consisted of restitution claims. The major 
difficulty with this form of privatization is that the records needed to prove ownership are often 
inadequate or conflicting.   
The second method is privatization through sale of state property, under which a government 
trades its ownership claim for an explicit cash payment. This category takes two important forms. The 
first is direct sales (or asset sales) of state-owned enterprises (or some parts thereof) to an individual, 
an existing corporation, or a group of investors. The second form is share issue privatizations (SIPs), 
in which some or all of a government’s stake in a SOE is sold to investors through a public share 
offering. These are similar to IPOs in the private sector, but where private IPOs are structured 
primarily to raise revenue, SIPs are structured to raise money and to respond to some of the political 
factors mentioned earlier. 
 
Brada’s (1996) third category is mass or voucher privatization, whereby eligible citizens can 
use vouchers that are distributed free or at nominal cost to bid for stakes in SOEs or other assets 
being privatized. This method has been used only in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, where it has brought about fundamental changes in the ownership of business assets in those 
countries, although it has not always changed effective control. Longer descriptions of the issues that 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe have confronted when designing voucher privatization 
programs are provided in Bornstein (1994, 1999), Alexandrowicz (1994), Drum (1994) and Shafik 
(1995).  
The final method is privatization from below, through the startup of new private businesses in 
formerly socialist countries. Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) also stress the importance of this 
type of economic growth in the transition economies. Although privatization from below has 
progressed rapidly in many regions (including China, the transition economies of central and Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa), a survey of this phenomenon is being the scope of 
our paper.  
There are many other methods besides the four described above that governments can use to 
increase private-sector participation. For example, the term “privatization” in the United States means 
something different from any of these strategies. As López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) 
show, the privatization debate in the U.S. refers to the choice between in-house provision of goods 
and services by (state and local) government employees and the contracting out of that production to   23
private firms. Their empirical study finds that the more binding are state fiscal constraints and the less 
powerful are public-sector unions, the greater the likelihood of privatization.  
4.2. The Choice of the Method of Sale 
Gibbon (1997) provides one of the most helpful delineations of the decisions facing a 
government that wants to privatize through cash sales. Gibbon discusses the steps such a government 
must take in developing a divestment program. These include setting up a structure for privatization 
(including legislation, if necessary), providing adequate performance records for SOEs being sold 
(generating believable accounting data), developing any necessary new regulatory structures, and 
determining the appropriate post-sale relationship between the firm and the government. Other 
authors who examine non-pricing issues relating to the actual divestment contracts involved in 
privatization include Baldwin and Bhattacharya (1991), Rondinelli and Iacono (1996), Schmidt 
(1996), Shafik (1996), and Cornelli and Li (1997). 
Two empirical  papers analyze the choice of privatization method. One explicitly studies the 
choice between an asset sale and a share issue privatization. Using a sample of 1,992 privatizations 
that raised $720 billion in 92 countries, Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2000) examine why 
767 firms are divested using share offerings (in public capital markets), but 1225 companies are 
privatized via direct sales (in private markets). They find robust results that the choice is influenced by 
capital market, political and firm-specific factors and report that SIPs are more likely to be used when 
capital markets are less developed, presumably as a way to develop capital markets, and when there is 
less income inequality. SIPs are also more likely the larger the size of the offering and the more 
profitable the SOE. On the other hand, governments that have a greater ability to commit to property 
rights are more likely to privatize via asset sales. Perhaps the most interesting result is that 
governments choose to privatize the more profitable SOEs through SIPs, which is evidence 
supporting the possibility of sample selection bias in studies of the performance of privatized firms. In 
the second paper, Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (1999) estimate the determinants of the fraction 
of privatization revenues that come from public offerings (SIPs) for privatizations in 49 countries. 
They find that the greater the selling government’s deficit and the more conservative the selling 
government, the more likely it is that privatization will occur through public offerings. However, SIPs 
are less likely in French civil law countries.   
   24
4.3. Restructuring SOEs Prior to Sale and Sequencing and Staging of SOE Sales 
One of the more complex issues in this area involves the interrelated questions of when to 
privatize, whether to privatize rapidly or slowly, what order to follow in privatizing firms 
(sequencing), whether to sell an SOE at once or in stages (staging), whether to restructure a SOE 
prior to sale (or to just restructure the SOE), and the role of macroeconomic reform in privatization. 
Since this is a complex issue that involves factors outside the scope of this article (especially 
macroeconomic reform which we do not discuss) we do not spend much time on this topic. Further, 
the complexity of the issue has limited the empirical work in this area. 
Several authors have theoretically modeled the question of sequencing and staging of SOE 
sales, including Katz and Owen (1993, 1995), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996b), Cornelli and Li 
(1997), Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999). The models illustrate the importance of the 
sequencing and staging to build reputational capital with investors by the privatizing government, 
building domestic support for the privatization program, as well as identifying bidders that maximize 
the efficiency of the firm in the future. However, the complexities of these interrelationships have 
limited the ability of empiricists to identify factors in sequencing and staging. Several articles that do 
empirically examine sequencing or staging are Perotti and Guney (1993), Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997), Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), and Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen 
(2000).    
A related practical question about privatization is whether governments should restructure 
SOEs (e.g., lay off redundant workers) prior to selling or leave this to the new owners. This is related 
to the question we discussed in section 3.4, can governments reform SOEs (including reform without 
privatization) and the question of whether reform and privatization should proceed quickly or slowly. 
Early advice from the World Bank (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989) was that governments should restructure 
SOEs prior to divestment, since governments are better able than private owners to cushion the 
financial blow to any displaced workers by using unemployment or pension payments. Government-
led restructuring can thus provide a private buyer of the SOE with a “clean slate.” Preparing 
companies for privatization was standard practice in the U.K. during the 1980s, in part to smooth the 
transition with the trade unions. However, by 1992, the same authors (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 
1992) had become more nuanced in their interpretation of the optimal strategy. They said (p. 54) that 
small and medium-sized SOEs “should be sold ‘as is’ at the best price possible, as quickly as   25
possible.” However, they also noted that in all cases (p. 60) new investments “should be left to private 
owners once a decision has been made to privatise the enterprise.”  
Two empirical papers that examine SOE reform prior to privatization are López-de-Silanes 
(1997) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2000). López-de-Silanes (1997) examines whether prior 
government restructuring of SOEs improves the net price received for the company, and finds 
evidence that it does not. He shows that prices received by the government would have increased by 
71 cents per dollar of assets if the only restructuring step taken by the government had been to fire the 
CEO and if the assets had been divested an average of one year earlier. He argues that other 
restructuring steps slow down the process and consume too many resources to be worthwhile. The 71 
cents per dollar improvement would be a significant improvement on the average 54 cents per dollar 
of assets actually received by the governments. However, this evidence is based on a small sample of 
banks, which limits its usefulness. Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) find some evidence that the 
improvements brought about by privatization occur before the SOE is privatized.   
4.4. Pricing and Allocation of Control and Ownership in SOE Sales 
Although mass or voucher privatization programs have attracted a great deal of academic 
interest, asset sales and SIPs account for most of the value of assets that have been moved from state 
to private employment during the past two decades.
18  Thus, in this discussion of the pricing and 
allocation of control and ownership in the privatization of SOEs, we focus on these two divestment 
methods.  
4.4.1. Pricing Decisions in Asset Sales 
Four papers study the revenue impact of SOE direct sale pricing decisions. At a theoretical 
level, Bulow and Kemperer (1996) ask whether it is more profitable to sell a company through an 
auction with no reserve price or by using an optimally structured direct negotiation with one less 
bidder. They show that under most conditions, a simple competitive auction with N+1 bidders will 
yield more expected revenue than a seller could expect to earn by fully exploiting his or her monopoly 
selling position against N bidders. López-de-Silanes’ (1997) study of Mexican privatizations 
empirically supports this theoretical conclusion that maximizing the number of bidders in an open 
                                                 
18  However, it is also true that a much larger number of companies have been transferred to private 
ownership through mass privatization programs. It is also likely that more employees have been from firms that 
were transferred in mass schemes than from firms that were sold in SIPs. We thank John Nellis for pointing this 
out to us.   26
auction is usually the best way to maximize revenues.
19  He finds that prices received are sensitive to 
the level of competition in the auction process but that the Mexican government frequently restricted 
participation (particularly by foreigners) in spite of this fact. Nonetheless, the amount of revenue 
generated was the main criteria in selecting the winning bidder for more than 98 percent of the SOEs 
sold. 
Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) examine auctions in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
thousands of small businesses have been auctioned off, as well as in Latin America and Russia, where 
larger SOEs have been sold. Many types of auctions have been used, including English, Dutch, first 
price, second price, double, and pro-rata sales. Auctions have been used to sell both lease rights and 
ownership rights. In other cases, governments have sold SOEs directly to groups of private investors 
or firms, setting prices and terms by negotiation. In some cases, the groups of investors consist of 
management or employees. In other cases, the government has liquidated the SOE and sold physical 
assets to a group of investors.   
Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija (1997) examine an actual voucher privatization program, the 
first round of the Czech Republic’s mass privatization in 1991. Because the mechanics of how 
companies are divested by this government are actually more similar to an asset sale than to any other 
method, we discuss their work here. Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija test whether the level of share 
demand, as measured by voucher redemptions by Czech citizens, effectively predicts the actual level 
of stock prices in the secondary market. The authors confirm the predictive power of share demand, 
and also document that share demand is positively related to the level of insider shareholdings and the 
extent of foreign ownership in a company being sold. They find that share demand is positively related 
to the level of past profitability, which itself shows that even imperfect accounting statements convey 
useful information. Additionally, they find that share demand is inversely related to the firm’s market 
risk, which they measure as the post-offering coefficient of variation of stock prices. 
4.4.2. Pricing and Share and Control Allocation Decisions in Share Issue Privatizations (SIPs) 
Any government that intends to privatize SOEs using public share offerings faces three sets of 
interrelated decisons: (1) how to transfer control, (2) how to price the offer, and (3) how to allocate 
shares. The control transfer decision includes whether to sell the SOE all at once or through a series 
                                                 
19  The Mexican program relied almost exclusively on direct sales, rather than SIPs, as its principal 
divestment technique.   27
of partial sales. If the government chooses the latter course, then it must determine how large a 
fraction of the company’s shares to issue in the initial versus subsequent offers. The government must 
also decide whether to insert any post-privatization restrictions on corporate control. The pricing 
decision requires that the government determine the amount of underpricing, whether the offer price 
should be set by a tender offer, a book-building exercise, or at a fixed price. If the latter, the 
government must decide whether the offering price should be set immediately prior to the offer or 
many weeks in advance. The share allocation decision requires the government to choose whether to 
favor one group of potential investors over another (i.e., domestic investors, SOE employees, or 
both, over foreign and institutional investors). It also requires deciding whether to use the best 
available investment banker as lead underwriter (regardless of nationality) or to favor a national 
champion. 
Several papers empirically examine the choices governments actually make in designing SIP 
programs. Menyah and Paudyal (1995) and Inganyete, Menyah, and Paudyal (1996) investigate the 
way in which the aims and objectives of privatization influence the procedures and incentives used in 
the sale of state-owned shares on the London Stock Exchange by the U.K. government. Jones, 
Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), Huang and Levich (1998), and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) 
present comprehensive studies of the pricing and share and control allocation decisions made by 
governments disposing of SOEs through public share offering. The results are broadly similar so we 
concentrate on the paper by Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) since it has the largest 
sample.  
Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), whose results are summarized in Table 2, provide 
evidence on the way in which political factors impact the offer pricing, share allocation, and other 
terms in SIPs. They analyze a large sample of 630 SIPs from 59 countries made over the period June 
1977 to July 1997.
20   One result Jones et al. document is the sheer size of SIP offers -- the mean 
(median)size of initial SIPs is $555.7 million ($104.0 million) and the mean size of seasoned issues is 
$1.069 billion (median $311.0 million), much larger than typical stock offerings.  Jones et al. also find 
that SIPs are significantly underpriced by government sellers. The mean level of underpricing for 
                                                 
20  Though Jones et al. rely primarily on Privatisation International for the data used in this study; one of 
the authors has also developed from secondary sources (primarily the Financial Times, but also publications such 
as Price Waterhouse, 1989b) an appendix that details similar information for an additional 500 SIPs. This 
appendix can be obtained upon request by contacting wmegginson@ou.edu .   28
initial SIPs is 34.1 percent (median 12.4 percent). Even seasoned SIP offers are underpriced by an 
average of 9.4 percent (median 3.3 percent). We return to the issue of the determinants of 
underpricing in Section 6. (See table #2) 
The evidence of Jones et al. on the allocation of control in SIPs supports a political 
interpretation of the divesting governments’ motives. Jones et al. find that nearly all SIPs are 
essentially secondary offerings, in which only the government sells its shares and no money flows to 
the firm itself. Since the divesting government sells an average (median) of 43.9 percent (35.0 
percent) of the SOE’s capital in initial offers and 22.7 percent (18.1 percent) in seasoned issues, the 
offers cited in the Jones et al. study represent significant reductions in direct government stock 
ownership. The authors find that although governments typically surrender day-to-day operating 
control of the SOE to private owners in the initial SIP, they retain effective veto power through a 
variety of techniques. The most common technique is government retention of a “golden share,” 
which gives it the power to veto certain actions, such as foreign takeovers.
21   
4.5. The Structure of Voucher Privatizations 
Voucher privatization is by far the most controversial method of divesting state-owned assets. 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that the decision to pursue mass privatization, and even 
the specific design of the programs, is largely dictated by politics. The privatization programs 
practiced in Western Europe and elsewhere were politically difficult to execute in Eastern Europe, 
although Hungary, Estonia, and Poland used case-by-case privatizations, which have been successful 
at a macro level.
22  Nonetheless, voucher privatization schemes can be made attractive from an 
economic perspective, since they maximize value, foster free and efficient markets, and promote 
effective corporate governance.  
                                                 
21  Though golden shares have been widely adopted, they are in fact almost never used to affect control 
contests (McCurry, 2000). The EU is trying to block new adoptions of golden shares and roll back those already 
in place, charging they are designed to discourage free cross-border competition for corporate control. At a recent 
OECD conference, the director of Italy’s privatization program, Vittorio Grilli, pointed out an additional political 
problem with exercising a golden share: When a government uses its share to veto a takeover bid, this is 
equivalent to publicly stating it does not approve of the bidder. Such a statement is awkward at best, and could 
cause an international incident if the bidder is a foreign company.  
22  Using a subset of firms, Nellis (1996) describes how the Estonians sold off majority shares to strategic 
investors and then exchanged the minority shares for vouchers.   29
Katz and Owen (1997) investigate what they call the “voucher portfolio problem.” This 
problem arises whenever the proportion of ownership resulting from a given voucher bid is unknown, 
but the post-privatization performance of a divested company largely depends on the skills of the new 
owners and their respective ownership stakes. Katz and Owen also provide a good discussion of the 
philosophical differences between the Czech program, which relied heavily on vouchers and 
prohibited post-sale trading of stock, and the Russian program, which privatized relatively small (29 
percent on average) stakes in most firms and allowed unrestricted trading of vouchers. 
Although most countries’ actual experience with vouchers has been poor, none has been quite 
as dismal as Russia’s. Although a variety of factors have played a role, Frydman, Pistor, and 
Rapaczynski (1996) show that insider control of privatized firms has been by far the most important 
impediment to effective reform. Initially, the Russian government had high hopes that the “voucher 
privatization funds” (VPFs) formed during the initial voucher distributions might be able to overcome 
the collective action problem inherent in mass privatization programs. Such funds might use their 
concentrated ownership in privatized firms to force managers to restructure. Though most funds 
attempted to exercise their “voice” in corporate boardrooms, insider dominance completely blocked 
their efforts. The VPFs turned instead to their “exit” option and sold shares on the secondary market.  
Pistor and Spicer (1997) also examine the early promise and subsequent failure of 
privatization investment funds in Russia and the Czech Republic. In both countries, citizens have 
become owners of the worst performing privatized assets, while the “crown jewels” have all come 
under insider control. As the authors say, “… establishing property rights is a longer and more 
complicated process than allocating title.” Blanchard and Aghion (1996) also conclude that 
privatization is proceeding slowly in Eastern Europe, largely because insiders, who currently have 
control of firms but no property rights, oppose outsider privatization. Given this reality, Blanchard 
and Aghion examine whether privatization would proceed more rapidly if governments were simply to 
allocate property rights to insiders (insider privatization). However, they find there is a wedge 
between the private value of the firm to insiders and its value to an outsider, and that this difference 
might well preclude value-increasing exchanges. Given the actual experience with insider dominance 
of most voucher privatizations, we conclude that this wedge is in fact alive, well, and fully 
operational.  
   30
5.  Has Privatization Improved the Financial and Operating Performance of Divested Firms? 
Since privatization has been part of government policy tool-kits for almost two decades now, 
academic researchers have had enough time to execute many empirical studies of the effect of 
divestment on the operating performance of former SOEs. However, there are difficult 
methodological problems with research in this area.
23  An important problem is
  that of data availability 
and consistency. The amount of information that must be disclosed is much less in most countries 
than in the United States, and these standards vary from country to country as well as within 
countries over time. A large literature in accounting has shown that management can manipulate U.S. 
accounting data, and this problem is probably greater for international firms. Furthermore, the 
possibility of sample selection bias can arise from several sources, including the desire of governments 
to make privatization “look good” by privatizing the healthiest firms first.  
There are also many problems in measuring performance changes that arise from using 
accounting or stock data. We discuss the problems with stock return data in section 6, but the 
problems with accounting data are more important since many empirical studies employ primarily 
accounting information. These problems include determining the correct measure of operating 
performance, selecting an appropriate benchmark with which to compare performance, and 
determining the appropriate statistical tests to use (see Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994) 
and Barber and Lyon (1996)). The finance literature has not reached a consensus on the ways to deal 
with these problems for U.S. companies, much less privatized international firms. Therefore, the 
results of each of the studies we discuss must be kept in perspective. We also note that the studies of 
post-performance do not usually look at the welfare effects on consumers. Most important, few 
studies control for the possible use of market power by the privatized firms. That is, performance 
improvements could be due to greater exploitation of monopoly power, which has harmful effects on 
allocative efficiency, rather than productive efficiency. Many of the studies on performance changes 
after privatization examine the effects of divestiture on groups such as workers, but few examine the 
effect of privatization on consumers. On the other hand, one of the principal reasons for launching 
privatizations, particularly of monopoly utilities, is consumer dissatisfaction with a firm’s service. 
                                                 
23  Many of the difficulties are similar to those discussed in Temple (1999) who surveys cross-country 
research in the determinants of growth. Temple discusses the substantial problems that arise in estimating and 
interpreting cross-country regressions.   31
Furthermore, the studies cited here almost unanimously report increases in performance associated 
with privatization.
24  This consistency is perhaps the most telling result we report -- privatization 
appears to improve performance measured in many different ways, in many different countries.
25  
With the above caveats in mind, this section evaluates the results of 38 studies that employ 
accounting and/or real output data to examine the impact of privatization on the operating efficiency, 
ownership structure, and/or financial performance of former SOEs in developed, developing and 
transition economies. Though all these studies are detailed in the accompanying tables, and most are 
discussed at least briefly in the text, we also specify which studies we think are the most important—
and why we think this is so. To effectively synthesize such a large number of empirical studies, we 
first categorize papers according to whether they examine privatization in transition or non-transition 
economies. The latter studies are evaluated in section 5.1, while the transition economies are 
examined in section 5.2. This dichotomization is necessary, since both direct observation and 
published research suggest that reforming transition economies invariably requires embracing a great 
many economic and political changes simultaneously, whereas privatization (and attendant regulatory 
changes) is often the sole major component of reform processes in non-transition economies. A 
further organizational step is to present, in Tables 3 through 7, summary information for each of the 
studies we examine. Presenting this information in tabular form saves us from having to sequentially 
discuss each paper’s sample construction methodology, estimation procedure, and empirical results in 
the section’s text. Instead, we can identify key findings that appear in many different studies, and can 
discuss methodological pros and cons for entire groups of studies, rather than for each paper in turn. 
5.1. Empirical Studies Employing Data From Non-Transition Economies 
We separate non-transition studies by empirical methodology, depending upon how the papers 
compare performance changes resulting from privatization. The first set of papers examines a single 
industry, a single country, or one or a small number of individual firms. While these studies employ a 
variety of empirical techniques, most compare actual post-privatization performance changes with 
                                                 
24  A cynic might say that all of the gains researchers have documented after privatization are due to 
selection bias. However, while there is some evidence discussed elsewhere that the better firms are privatized, at 
least in SIPs the evidence is still strong that performance improves after privatization. Further, the paper that does 
the best job of controlling for selection bias, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999), finds privatized 
firms perform better than SOEs. 
25  Temple (1999) also notes the importance of both historical case studies and cross-sectional analysis in 
assessing recent developments in the economic theory of growth.   32
either a comparison group of non-privatized firms or with a “counter-factual” expectation of what 
would have occurred if the privatized firms themselves had remained state-owned. The second set of 
studies examine only firms divested through public share offerings, and measure privatization-related 
performance changes by comparing the 3-year mean or median operating and financial performance of 
divested firms to their own mean or median performance during their last three years as state-owned 
firms. 
5.1.1. Case Study, Single-Industry and Single-Country Empirical Studies: Non-Transition 
Economies 
The studies we examine in this section are summarized in Table 3. The first study listed merits 
detailed analysis because it has proven so influential, both due to the rigor of its methodology and 
because it was sponsored by the World Bank. Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1992) compare 
the actual post-privatization performance of 12 large firms--mostly airlines and regulated utilities--in 
Britain, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico to the predicted performance of these firms had they not been 
divested. Using this counter-factual approach, the authors document net welfare gains in 11 of the 12 
cases considered which equal, on average, 26 percent of the firm’s pre-divestiture sales. They find no 
case where workers are made significantly worse off, and three where workers significantly benefit. 
Newberry and Pollitt (1997) perform a similar counter-factual analysis of the 1990 restructuring and 
privatization of the U.K.’s Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), and document significant 
post-privatization performance improvements. However, they find that the producers and their 
shareholders capture all of the financial rewards of this improvement and more, whereas the 
government and consumers lose out. The authors conclude that CEGB’s restructuring and 
privatization was in fact “worth it,” but could have been implemented more efficiently and with 
greater concern for the public’s welfare.
26  (See table #3) 
Two of the studies described in Table 3 examine national privatization experiences. Martin 
and Parker (1995) find that, after adjusting for business cycle effects, less than half the British firms 
they study perform better after being privatized. The authors do, however, find evidence of a “shake-
                                                 
26  The privatization and liberalization of the British electricity industry is also discussed at length in 
Newberry (1997) and Vickers and Yarrow (1991), while the regulatory regime adopted for earlier utility 
privatizations is described in Beesley and Littlechild (1989). None of these works showers the Thatcher 
government with praise for its policy decisions, though Beesley and Littlechild do find the RPI-X price regulation 
system adopted in the U.K. is superior to the U.S. rate of return regulatory regime.    33
out” effect, where several firms improve performance prior to being privatized (but not afterward). 
The results of the second national study are far less ambiguous. LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999) 
find that the former Mexican SOEs they study rapidly close a large performance gap with industry-
matched private firms that had existed prior to divestment. These firms go from being highly 
unprofitable before privatization to being very profitable thereafter. Output increases 54.3 percent, in 
spite of a reduced level of investment spending, and sales per employee roughly doubles. The 
privatized firms reduce (blue and white-collar) employment by half, but those workers who remain are 
paid significantly more. The authors attribute most of the performance improvement to productivity 
gains resulting from better incentives, with at most one-third of the improvement being attributable to 
lower employment costs.  
Three of the papers described in Table 3 are essentially case studies of individual privatized 
companies, though two of the articles benchmark performance changes with respect to one or more 
private companies. Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997) examine the effect of British Airways’ 1987 
privatization on competitors’ stock prices and on fares charged in those routes where BA competes 
directly with foreign airlines. They find that the stock prices of U.S. competitors fall, as do airfares in 
markets served by BA; both findings suggest that stock traders anticipated a much more competitive 
BA would result from the divestiture.
27  Laurin and Bozec (1999) compare the productivity and 
profitability of two large Canadian rail carriers (one state-owned and one private-sector), both before 
and after the 1995 privatization of Canadian National. They find that CN’s relatively poor 
performance during the “fully state-owned period” (1981-1991) rapidly converges on Canadian 
Pacific’s performance levels during the pre-privatization, but post-announcement period (1992-1995), 
and then surpasses it thereafter. These findings suggest two separable impacts of privatization on firm 
performance: an “anticipation” effect prior to divestiture and a “follow through” effect subsequently. 
The final case study, Ramamurti (1997), examines the 1990 restructuring and privatization of 
Ferrocarilla Argentino, the Argentine national freight and passenger railway system. The author 
documents a nearly incredible 370 percent improvement in labor productivity and an equally striking 
                                                 
27  Eckel, Eckel, and Singal also examine the two-stage privatization of Air Canada (from 100 percent 
state ownership to 57 percent, then to zero). Unlike BA, Air Canada does not compete with U.S. carriers on many 
routes, so there is no significant competitor stock price effect resulting from its divestiture. Air Canada’s fares do 
not fall after the first, partial privatization, but fall a significant 13.7 percent after the final, complete divestiture 
of state ownership.    34
(and not unrelated) 78.7 percent decline in employment--from 92,000 to 18,682 workers.
28  Operating 
subsidies declined almost to zero, and consumers benefited from expanded (and better quality) service 
and lower costs. Ramamurti concludes that these performance improvements could not have been 
achieved without privatization. 
No less than six of the studies detailed in Table 3 examine the telecommunications industry, 
which has been transformed by the twin forces of technological change and deregulation (including 
privatization) since 1984 — the year when the AT&T monopoly was broken-up in the United States 
and the Thatcher government began privatizing British Telecom. Five of these are empirical studies, 
while Ramamurti (1996) provides a simple, though highly readable, summary of empirical studies 
examining four telecom privatizations in Latin America. Ramamurti concludes that all were judged to 
be political and economic success stories. Unfortunately, the empirical studies tell somewhat 
conflicting stories, probably due in part to differences in the nations covered and methodology 
employed. Petrazini and Clark (1996), Ros (1999) and Wallsten (2000a) examine developing 
countries, either exclusively or as separate subsamples, while Ros (1999) and Boylaud and Nicoletti 
(2000) provide similar coverage of OECD countries, and Boles de Boer and Evans (1996) studies the 
deregulation and privatization of Telecom New Zealand. Though Ros, Wallsten, and Boylaud and 
Nicoletti all use some variant of panel data methodology, they arrive at slightly different conclusions 
regarding the relative importance of deregulation/liberalization and privatization in promoting 
expanded teledensity (number of main lines per 100 population) and operating efficiency of national 
telecom companies, and the quality and pricing of telecom services. On balance, these studies 
generally indicate that deregulation and liberalization of telecom services are associated with 
significant growth in teledensity and operating efficiency, and significant improvements in the quality 
and price of telecom services. The impact of privatization, per se, is somewhat less clear-cut, but most 
studies agree that the combination of privatization and deregulation/liberalization is associated with 
significant telecommunications improvements. This is certainly the result predicted by Noll (2000) in 
his analysis of the political economy of telecom reform in developing countries. The D’Souza and 
                                                 
28  Ramamurti details the intense political maneuvering that accompanied the attempt to restructure and 
slim down FA. The generous severance payments awarded to displaced workers were instrumental in winning 
union acquiescence in the restructuring plan, while the presence of effective road transport competition for rail 
traffic reduced the threat of a potentially crippling strike weapon.   35
Megginson (2000) study’s findings—described in the following section—also support the idea that 
telecom privatization yields net benefits.
 29  
5.1.2. Empirical Studies Comparing Pre- Versus Post-Privatization Performance For SIPs 
The studies summarized in Table 4 all examine how privatization affects firm performance by 
comparing pre- versus post-divestment data for companies privatized via public share offering. Since 
the first study to be published using this methodology is Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh 
(1994), we will refer to this is the MNR methodology. This empirical procedure has several obvious 
economic and econometric drawbacks. Of these, selection bias probably causes the greatest concern, 
since by definition a sample of SIPs will be biased towards very the largest companies sold during any 
nation’s privatization program. Furthermore, since governments have a natural tendency to privatize 
the “easiest” firms first, those SOEs sold via share offerings (particularly those sold early in the 
process) may well be among the healthiest state-owned firms.
30  Another drawback of the MNR 
methodology is its need to examine only simple, universally available accounting variables (such as 
assets, sales, and net income) or physical units such as number of employees. Obviously, researchers 
must be careful when comparing accounting information generated at different times in many different 
countries. Most of the studies cited here also ignore (or, at best, imperfectly account for) changes in 
the macroeconomy or industry over the seven year event window during which they compute pre- 
versus post-privatization performance changes. Finally, the studies cannot account for the impact on 
privatized firms of any regulatory or market-opening initiatives that often are launched simultaneously 
with or immediately after major privatization programs. (See table #4) 
                                                 
29  Though they do not quite fit into our empirical classification scheme, six related studies deserve 
mention here. Smith and Wellenius (1999) and Wellenius (2000) present normative analyses of telecom 
regulation in developing countries, while Wasserfallen and M￿ller (1998) discuss the privatization and 
deregulation of western Europe’s telecom industry. Pollitt (1997) analyzes the impact of liberalization on the 
performance of the international electric supply industry, and Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalso (1999) document 
that effective regulation is a crucial institutional variable in electric utility privatization. Establishing such a 
regulatory regime allows governments to increase the pace of privatization, sell higher stakes, and maximize 
offering proceeds. Finally, Wallsten (2000b) shows that exclusivity periods, which are usually granted to telecom 
monopolies as they are being privatized, are economically harmful to consumers and do not achieve the efficiency 
objectives assigned to them at the time of divestment. Exclusivity periods do, however, raise the price that 
investors are willing to pay for privatized telecoms, which largely explains why they are employed.  
30  Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2000) find that governments selling SOEs tend to sell the more 
profitable SOEs in the public capital markets and the less profitable in the less transparent private markets. Those 
sold in the public capital markets are the firms that appear in studies of performance. Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2000) also show performance improvements before privatization in firms that are being privatized.   36
In spite of these drawbacks, studies employing the MNR methodology have two key 
advantages. First, they are the only studies that can examine and directly compare large samples of 
economically significant firms, from different industries, privatized in different countries, over 
different time periods. Since each firm is compared to itself (a few years earlier) using simple, 
inflation-adjusted sales and income data (that produce results in simple percentages), this 
methodology allows one to efficiently aggregate multi-national, multi-industry results. This point is 
made clear in Table 5, which summarizes the results of three studies that use precisely the same 
empirical proxies and test methodology—and can thus be aggregated and directly compared--yet 
examine non-overlapping samples. In total, these three studies examine seven performance criteria for 
204 companies from 41 countries. Second, while focusing on SIPs yields a selection bias, it also yields 
samples that encompass the largest and most politically influential privatizations. As discussed in 
section 4, SIPs account for more than two-thirds of the $1 trillion of total revenues raised by 
governments since 1977. With these methodological caveats in mind, we turn to a summary of the 
findings of studies using the MNR technique. (See table #5) 
All of these studies offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatization is 
associated with significant improvements in the operating and financial performance of SOEs divested 
via public share offering. Two of these studies focus on specific industries (banking [Verbrugge, et al. 
(1999)] and telecommunications [D’Souza and Megginson (2000)]), one examines data from a single 
country (Chile [Macquieira and Zurita (1996)]), and the other six employ multi-industry, multi-
national samples. Five of these studies—MNR (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999, 2000) and Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2000)—document economically and 
statistically significant post-privatization increases in real sales (output), profitability, efficiency (sales 
per employee), and capital spending, coupled with significant declines in leverage. Macquieira and 
Zurita find similar results for Chilean firms using data that is not adjusted for changes experienced by 
other Chilean firms over the study period, but many of these improvements cease to be statistically 
significant once such adjustments are made. Verbrugge, et al. (1999) document significant, though 
modest, increases in the profitability and capital adequacy of commercial banks privatized in OECD 
countries, as well as significant declines in leverage, but they also find substantial ongoing state 
involvement in these banks’ affairs.    37
Finally, Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) estimate the effects of government ownership and 
privatization using a sample of large firms from three separate time periods (1975, 1985 and 1995), 
compiled by Fortune. They estimate regressions explaining profitability controlling for firm size, 
location, industry, and the business cycle. They find that net income-based profitability measures 
increase significantly after privatization, but operating income-based measures do not. Instead, they 
find that operating profits increase prior to divestiture, once more supporting the idea that 
privatization can have a significant anticipation effect. 
5.1.3. Summary and Analysis 
These 22 studies from non-transition economies offer at least limited support for the 
proposition that privatization is associated with improvements in the operating and financial 
performance of divested firms. Several of the studies offer strong support for this proposition, and 
only Martin and Parker (1995) document outright performance declines (for six of eleven British 
firms) after privatization. Almost all studies that examine post-privatization changes in output, 
efficiency, profitability, capital investment spending and leverage document significant increases in the 
first four and significant declines in leverage.  
The studies examined here are far less unanimous regarding the impact of privatization on 
employment levels in privatized firms. All governments fear that privatization will cause former SOEs 
to shed workers, and the key question in virtually every case is whether the divested firm’s sales will 
increase enough after privatization to offset the dramatically higher levels of per-worker productivity. 
Three studies document significant increases in employment [Galal, et al. (1992), Megginson, Nash 
and van Randenborgh (1994), and Boubakri and Cosset (1998)], two find insignificant changes 
[Macquieira and Zurita (1996) and D’Souza and Megginson (2000)], while the remaining five 
document significant -- sometimes massive--employment declines [Ramamurti (1997), LaPorta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Laurin and Bozec (2000), D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and Boardman, 
Laurin and Vining (2000)]. These conflicting results could be due to differences in methodology, 
sample size and make-up, or omitted factors. However, it is more likely that the studies reflect real 
differences in post-privatization employment changes between countries and between industries. In 
other words, there is no “standard” outcome. Perhaps the safest conclusion we can assert is that 
privatization does not automatically mean employment reductions in divested firms—though this will   38
likely occur unless sales can increase fast enough after divestiture to offset very large productivity 
gains. 
In our opinion, the Galal, et al (1992), LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2000), and the three articles summarized in D’Souza and Megginson (1999) are the most 
persuasive studies examined in this section. As mentioned, the main strength of Galal et al. is its 
construction and use of a clear “counter-factual” that (virtually uniquely) allows both the financial and 
welfare gains from privatization to be measured. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes execute what we 
consider the best single-country study, since it examines almost the entire population of Mexican 
privatizations and compares performance changes to industry-matched private firms.  Dewenter and 
Malatesta both contrast the performance of private-sector and state-owned firms over three non-
overlapping periods and study how the performance of privatized firms changes over an extended 
time period. Finally, D’Souza and Megginson’s summary and comparison of three studies that use the 
same methodology—but non-overlapping samples—provides compelling evidence that the operating 
and financial gains to privatization are pervasive. 
Since the empirical studies discussed in this section generally document performance 
improvements after privatization, a natural follow-on question is to ask why performance improves. 
As we will discuss in the next section, a key determinant of performance improvement in transition 
economies is bringing in new managers after privatization. No study explicitly documents systematic 
evidence of this occurring in non-transition economies, but Wolfram (1998) and Cragg and Dyck 
(1999a, 1999b) show that the compensation and pay-performance sensitivity of managers of 
privatized UK firms increases significantly after divestment. The only study that explicitly addresses 
the sources of post-privatization performance improvement using data from multiple non-transition 
economies, D’Souza, et al (2000), finds stronger efficiency gains for firms in developing countries, in 
regulated industries, in firms that restructure operations after privatization, and in countries providing 
greater amounts of shareholder protection.  
We now turn to an examination of research findings about privatization’s impact in transition 
economies. Privatization is both more difficult and more all-encompassing in these countries than it is 
in either industrialized or non-transition developing countries.  
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5.2. Empirical Tests of Privatization in Transition Economies 
We again categorize the 21 empirical studies that examine privatization in transition 
economies into more manageable groups. Both direct observation and the findings of these studies 
suggest that a logical classification scheme is to evaluate separately studies that examine firms 
privatized in central and eastern Europe and those which study the privatization programs of Russia 
and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. These categories are evaluated in section 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2, respectively.  We then conclude section 5 with a brief overview of China’s liberalization 
and privatization program. 
5.2.1. Empirical Tests Examining Privatization Programs in Central and Eastern Europe 
The empirical studies that examine privatization programs in central and eastern Europe are 
summarized in Table 6. These countries employed varying methods of privatizing SOEs, including 
asset sales (Hungary and eastern Germany), voucher privatizations (the Czech Republic and early 
Polish divestitures), “spontaneous privatizations” (Slovenia), share offerings (later Polish sales), or a 
combination of techniques. The studies also cover differing event periods during the 1990s, employ 
differing empirical methodologies, and ask somewhat different questions—though all directly or 
indirectly ask how privatization impacts firm-level operating performance. Additionally, all of these 
studies must contend with the fact that output typically fell dramatically in every central and eastern 
European country during the period immediately after the collapse of socialism in 1989-91, though in 
most cases output later snapped back smartly.
31  These studies must therefore examine whether, for 
example, the output of privatized firms contracted less than did the output of firms that remained 
state-owned. These and other econometric challenges that must be faced in disentangling the effects 
of privatization, ownership structure changes, and other influences on the post-divestment 
performance of privatized firms in transition settings are discussed at length in Weiss and Nikitin 
(1999) and Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski [hereafter FGHR] (1999).  (See table #6) 
In spite of all the caveats spelled out above, the 11 studies summarized in Table 6 yield 
surprisingly consistent results regarding the impact of privatization on the performance of divested 
central and eastern European firms. This is especially true of the four studies--Dyck (1997), Weiss 
                                                 
31   This “U-shape” pattern of aggregate output in 26 transition economies is documented and examined 
econometrically in Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2000). They find that structural reforms—
including privatization—are critically important in promoting rapid recovery from the initial economic decline. 
Taken as a whole, their results strongly support a “radical” approach to reforms.   40
and Nikitin (1999), Claessens and Djankov (1999b), and Frydman, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000)--
we consider the most persuasive due to sample size, period of coverage and/or methodological rigor. 
All but one [Harper (2000)] of the studies detailed in Table 6 explicitly test whether the type of 
ownership structure that emerges from the privatization process is related to post-privatization 
performance, and these studies document consistent and significant relationships, as summarized 
below. Other things equal: 
§ Private ownership is associated with better firm-level performance than is continued state 
ownership. In addition, concentrated private ownership is associated with greater performance 
improvement than is diffuse ownership. 
§ Foreign ownership, where allowed, is associated with greater post-privatization performance 
improvement than is purely domestic ownership.
32  Furthermore, majority ownership by outside 
(non-employee) investors is associated with significantly greater performance improvements than 
is any form of insider control.
   
§ Firm-level restructuring is associated with significant (sometimes dramatic) post-privatization 
performance improvements, and this is one key advantage of outsider control—firms controlled 
by non-employee investors are much more likely to restructure than are employee-owned firms. 
§ Most studies document that performance improves more when new managers are brought in to 
run a firm after it is privatized than when the original managers are retained. The precise reason 
for the superior performance of new management is unclear, though FGHR (2000) find that the 
more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider-owned firms is due to incentive rather than human 
capital effects. 
§ The role of investment funds in promoting efficiency improvements in privatized Czech firms is 
ambiguous. FGHR (1999) find selling a SOE to a domestic financial company significantly 
increases the growth rate of a privatized firm, while Weiss and Nikitin (1998) find that 
concentrated ownership by investment funds is not associated with performance improvements. 
                                                 
32   In his analysis of the reasons why Hungary’s privatization program has proven to be so much more 
successful than those in most other central and eastern European countries, Mihalyi (2000) emphasizes the 
importance of selling SOEs directly to western transnational companies, and thus plugging them into the global 
trading system. Other countries stressed domestic over foreign ownership, and thus missed out on the opportunity 
of using privatization as a way of attracting foreign direct investment.    41
Claessens and Djankov (1999b) document greater performance improvements for companies 
controlled by non-bank-sponsored investment funds than by bank-sponsored funds. 
§ The impact of privatization on employment is also ambiguous, primarily because employment falls 
for virtually all firms in transition economies after reforms are initiated. Harper (2000) documents 
employment declines following the first Czech mass privatization wave in 1992, but not after the 
second wave in 1994. FGHR (1999) is the only study that explicitly examines employment 
changes--after accounting for ownership structure changes--and the authors find that sales grow 
fast enough in outsider-controlled firms to offset the significant increase in labor productivity. 
§ There is little evidence that governments have been able to impose hard budget constraints on 
firms that remain state-owned after reforms begin. FGHR (2000) find that the threat of hard 
budget constraints falters for poorly-performing SOEs, since governments are unwilling to allow 
these firms to fail. However, both FGHR and Schaffer (1998) show that the burden of lower SOE 
creditworthiness falls on the state (as deferred taxes) or on state creditors, rather than on private 
creditors or suppliers.  
Given these observed patterns for central and eastern Europe, we next examine how privatization has 
impacted firm performance in the republics of the former Soviet Union. 
5.2.2. Empirical Tests Examining Privatization Programs in the Former Soviet Union  
Table 7 summarizes the results of six empirical studies that examine privatization programs in 
Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. It is very difficult to reach a simple 
conclusion regarding privatization’s impact in the former Soviet Union in general, and Russia in 
particular, for four principal reasons. First, the transition from socialism to capitalism was much more 
difficult and painful in the former Soviet Union republics than anywhere else in the world, both 
because these republics were under communist rule the longest and because the transition to 
capitalism also coincided with dissolution of the Soviet Union. Breaking up any continental scale 
nation was likely to prove traumatic; breaking up a country that was also an economic system proved 
doubly so. Second, the contraction in output that occurred in the former Soviet Union after 1991 was 
far greater than anywhere else--and there is as yet no upturn--making it very difficult to document any 
kind of relative performance improvement, or to assign causality to any improvement that is found. 
Third, it seems clear that the former Soviet Union republics—especially Russia—took a decided turn 
for the worse economically after 1997, so competently executed studies examining privatization’s   42
impact in the same country, but at different times, might well reach radically different conclusions. 
Finally, all five studies that examine Russia’s experience rely either on survey data or anecdotal 
evidence, so the “raw material” for empirical analysis is of much poorer quality here than in other 
regions. For these reasons, we believe that no truly persuasive empirical study of privatization in the 
former Soviet Union has yet been performed, nor is one likely until these economies stabilize and 
several years of reliable accounting (not survey) data become available.  (See table #7) 
In spite of the difficulties (and caveats) spelled out above, the studies summarized in Table 7 
do yield consistent conclusions. Certainly the most important result all these studies find is that insider 
privatization has been a failure throughout the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia, and that the 
concentrated managerial ownership structure that characterizes almost all privatized firms will likely 
hamper these economies for many years. As described in Bornstein (1994), Earle (1998), Earle and 
Estrin (1998), and Black, et al (2000), Russian reformers considered rapid privatization to be an 
imperative, and for this reason they opted for the politically expedient technique of favoring 
incumbent managers and employees with allocations of controlling shareholdings during the initial 
mass privatization waves of 1992-93. The investment funds created during this program proved 
ineffective, due primarily to insider control and poor legal protection of (outside) shareholder voting 
rights. In spite of this, Barberis, et al (1996), Earle (1998) and Earle and Estrin (1998) all document 
that privatization was associated with performance improvements in firms that were divested during 
the mass privatization program of the early 1990s. However, all three studies, as well as Djankov 
(1999a,b), find that post-privatization performance improves the most (or only) for firms which are 
outsider controlled, and all the studies stress the importance of bringing in new management 
whenever possible. Additionally, Djankov (1999a) finds that foreign share ownership is associated 
with significantly greater performance improvement than is purely domestic ownership, and Djankov 
(1999b) shows that managers who actually pay for divested firms (through management buy-outs) 
improve performance more than do managers who are effectively given control (through voucher 
schemes). 
The pivotal, disastrous event for Russia’s privatization program was the 1995 “loans for 
shares” scheme, which transferred control of the most valuable natural resource firms to a small group 
of “oligarchs” at very low prices. As discussed in Black, et al (2000), this corrupt and non-transparent 
transfer of assets precipitated widespread insider expropriation and commercial lawlessness, which   43
effectively decapitalized much of Russian industry. Russia’s privatization program provides an 
important cautionary tale of the dangers of allowing rampant self-dealing in privatized firms and 
makes clear that privatization is not an economic panacea.
33   
Does the Russian experience imply that a poorly designed privatization program is worse than 
none at all? Black et al. argue affirmatively, but Nellis (1999) and other commentators point out that 
many of Russia’s problems resulted from a collapse of central governmental authority, and would thus 
not likely be solved by re-nationalization. Perhaps the best long-term hope for economic revitalization 
in the former Soviet Union republics is the type of de novo private development described in 
Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999). One conclusion that we can draw from the privatization 
experience in transition economies is that allowing incumbent managers to gain control of privatized 
firms—whether through legal means or otherwise—will yield disappointing results. Whenever 
possible, firms should be privatized, for cash, in as transparent a method as possible, and through an 
auction or sale process that is open to the broadest possible cross-section of potential buyers 
(including foreigners). 
5.2.3. Privatization and Economic Reform in China 
China, one of the most important transition economies, has been vigorously pursuing 
economic reform since 1978. It has dramatically increased the total factor productivity [Li (1997)] of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises, largely by improving incentives [Groves, Hong, McMillan and 
Naughton (1994, 1995)] and decentralizing economic decision-making [Cao, Qian and Weingast 
(1999), Lau, Qian and Roland (2000)]. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party recently 
committed the country to a massive privatization program [Lin (2000)] under the slogan “seize the 
large, release the small,” which roughly translates as privatizing all but the largest 300 or so SOEs. 
Assuming this plan is even partially implemented, the result will be a privatization program of 
unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the World Trade Organization accord negotiated between China 
and the United States in November 1999 (and subsequently with the European Union in early 2000) 
may ultimately lead to China’s accession to the WTO. If this occurs, broad swathes of heretofore 
protected Chinese industry -- including telecommunications, automobile production, and financial 
                                                 
33   The Czech Republic’s market collapse of 1997, described in Coffee (1999), and the Lithuanian 
government’s tortuous privatization of the Mazheikiu Nafta refiner in early 2000, described by Samonis (2000) 
are also examples of what can go wrong in privatization programs.   44
services -- will be opened to international competition for the first time. This process will almost 
certainly increase the pressure on China to fully privatize its industry. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that China’s “privatization” program will do 
little to lessen the state’s role in economic decision-making, either at the macro or micro-economic 
levels. For one thing, the ownership structure of Chinese stock companies is unlike anything seen 
elsewhere in the world. As described by Xu and Wang (1997), Tian (2000) and Lin (2000), only one-
third of the stock in publicly-listed former Chinese SOEs can be owned by individuals; the remaining 
two-thirds of a company’s shares must be owned by the state and by domestic (usually financial) 
institutions—which are invariably state-owned. So called “A-shares” may be owned and traded only 
by Chinese citizens, while B-shares are stocks listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen that may be owned and 
traded only by foreigners. Other shares are listed in Hong Kong (H-shares) or New York (N-shares), 
and these are also restricted to foreigners. The net effect of this fractionalization of ownership is that, 
even in publicly listed former SOEs, control is never really contestable and the long-term financial 
performance of “privatized” Chinese companies has been quite poor. This is particularly true for the 
“Red Chip” (PRC-controlled companies incorporated and listed in Hong Kong) and H-shares sold in 
Hong Kong.
34   
These ownership restrictions could, however, be rescinded by government fiat at any time. 
Perhaps the key constraint on privatization in China is the fact that SOEs, rather than the government 
itself, serve as the country’s social safety net. As described in Bai, Li and Wang (1997) and Lin, Cai 
and Li (1998), Chinese SOEs are burdened with many social welfare responsibilities. Thus it is 
difficult to imagine the government adopting a privatization program that would either grant these 
firms discretion over staffing levels or subject them to truly enterprise threatening competition. In 
sum, the long-term prognosis for privatization in China is unclear; there is great scope for such a 
program to have a dramatic impact, coupled with great danger of social turmoil if handled (or 
sequenced) incorrectly.  
                                                 
34   We thank Cyril Lin, Samuel Huang and George Tian for helping us understanding Chinese listing 
procedures. See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCsite/eng/elaws/elaws.htm  for an English-language summary of 
Chinese securities laws.   45
We now re-direct our emphasis away from transition economies and examine whether 
investors who participate in share issue privatizations have, on average, benefited from these 
investments--both initially (first day) and longer term (up to five years).  
 
6.  Do Investors Benefit From Privatization? 
6.1. Initial Returns Earned by Investors in Share Issue Privatizations 
As noted earlier, governments generally rely on share offerings as the best method of 
privatizing large state-owned enterprises, and they routinely adopt highly politicized offer terms in 
order to achieve political objectives. Offering terms that differ fundamentally from those observed in 
private-sector offerings, plus the very large average size of privatization issues, have motivated many 
researchers to examine the initial and long term returns earned by SIP investors. Table 8 summarizes 
the results of ten studies examining initial returns. Most of these studies evaluate whether investors 
who purchase privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs) at the offering price, and then sell these 
shares on the first day of open market trading, earn returns that are significantly different from zero. 
Thus, these studies test whether PIPOs are “underpriced.” A few also test whether PIPOs yield initial 
returns that are materially different from the significantly positive first-day returns earned by investors 
in private-sector IPOs, as documented in a vast number of articles using both U.S. and international 
data. The U.S. market experience is summarized in Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) and 
international IPO underpricing studies are surveyed in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). (See 
table #8) 
 Five of the studies in Table 8 examine PIPO returns from individual countries. All five studies 
document significant, often massive, average levels of underpricing, ranging from 39.6 percent for the 
40 British PIPOs studied by Menyah and Paudyal (1996) to 940 percent for the 308 Chinese PIPOs 
examined by Su and Fleisher (1999). Menyah and Paudyal and Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) 
find that UK and Malaysian PIPOs are significantly more underpriced than their private-sector 
counterparts, and Ausenegg finds the same result for Polish PIPOs. Hungarian PIPOs are also more 
underpriced than private IPOs, but the difference is not significant (Jelic and Briston, 2000a). Since 
there are as yet few truly comparable private-sector IPOs in China, Su and Fleisher cannot test 
whether private offerings also have the incredible underpricing they document for PIPOs, but they do 
point to an intriguing rationale for this phenomenon based on the signalling model presented in Welch   46
(1989). Unlike almost any other comparable group of IPOs, over 90 percent of Chinese PIPOs do in 
fact execute seasoned equity offerings within a short time after the PIPO.  
The other five studies in Table 8 examine multi-national samples of PIPOs, generally using 
offering data from Privatisation International and stock returns from Datastream.  The number of 
countries studied ranges from eight in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) to 61 in Ljungqvist, Jenkinson 
and Wilhelm (2000), though the studies’ main results are similar. All these studies document 
economically and statistically significant underpricing of PIPOs, averaging about 30 percent in the 
large-sample studies. The two that examine seasoned SIPs (Huang and Levich (1998) and Jones, et 
al.) find these are significantly underpriced as well, though much less so than are PIPOs. Four of these 
studies—Dewenter and Malatesta (1987), Huang and Levich (1998), Choi and Nam (2000) and 
Ljungqvist, et al.—also test whether PIPOs are significantly more underpriced than private-sector 
IPOs. The first three studies find no systematic evidence that PIPOs are significantly more or less 
underpriced than private IPOs; instead all three suggest that results vary by country. However, the 
Ljungqvist, et al. study performs the most convincing analysis of the relative underpricing of IPOs and 
PIPOs, since they use regression methodology and a privatization dummy variable to examine 
underpricing for a sample of 2,051 IPOs—including 185 PIPOs—from 61 non-U.S. markets. They 
document that PIPOs are significantly more underpriced (by about 9 percentage points) than are 
private sector IPOs. They also find that the underwriting spreads on PIPOs are significantly lower (by 
a mean 61 basis points) than on IPOs. 
The principal objective of the Jones, et al. study differs from the others in that it tests whether 
government issuers are attempting to maximize SIP offering proceeds or are instead trying to achieve 
multiple political and economic objectives, even at the cost of revenue maximization. Jones, et al. test 
the underpricing models of Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999). Both models predict that 
governments that are ideologically committed to privatization and economic reform will deliberately 
underprice SIPs and will privatize in stages, to signal their commitment to protecting investor 
property rights. “Populist” governments that are pursuing privatization strictly as a means of raising 
revenue will be unwilling to underprice as much as will committed governments. Populist 
governments will also try to sell larger stakes in SOEs. Jones, et al. find that initial returns 
(underpricing) are significantly positively related to the fraction of the firm’s capital sold and to the 
degree of income inequality (Gini coefficient) in a country. They also find that initial returns are   47
negatively related to the level of government spending as a fraction of GDP (a proxy for how socialist 
a society is) and to a dummy variable indicating that more than 50 percent of a company’s stock is 
being sold. Collectively, these findings strongly support the predictions of Perotti (1995) and Biais 
and Perotti (1999).  
6.2. Long-Run Returns Earned by Investors in Share Issue Privatizations 
Since the seminal article by Ritter (1991), financial economists have paid close attention to 
estimating the long-run returns earned by investors who purchase unseasoned and seasoned issues. 
Most of these papers find significantly negative long-term returns, whether they examine U.S. 
offerings or international stock issues, though a few studies document insignificantly positive long-
term performance.
35   
￿here is a major debate in the empirical finance literature on methodological issues in 
estimating long-run returns. This is not surprising since findings of significant negative (or positive) 
long-run returns can be interpreted as evidence contradicting the efficient market hypothesis, a 
fundamental concept in finance. The debate centers on how to calculate long-run returns and how to 
construct test statistics. For example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that most corporate actions 
are not random events. They contend that after controlling for cross-correlation of abnormal returns, 
most statistical evidence of abnormal performance disappears. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), 
drawing on the work of Kothari and Warner (1997), and Barber and Lyon (1997a), note five reasons 
for misspecification in test statistics designed to detect long-run returns. There are three sources of 
bias -- a new listing bias, a re-balancing bias and a skewness bias -- as well as cross-sectional 
dependence in sample observations and a poorly specified asset-pricing model. Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai, among others, suggest several methods to control for misspecification, but there is no one 
correct method. They conclude that the “analysis of long-run returns is treacherous.” Canina, 
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1998) present a behavioral approach to dealing with long-run returns 
and Fama (1999) argues bad model problems are "unavoidable … and more serious in tests on long-
term returns.” Since the methodological problems identified with estimates of long-run returns have 
                                                 
35  Early long-run return studies, using both U.S. and international data, are summarized in Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). Later studies employing U.S. data, and finding negative long-run returns, include 
Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). Only a 
handful of U.S. studies, including Brav and Gompers (1997), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Eckbo, Masulis, 
and Norli (1999), find (insignificantly) positive long-term returns.   48
not been resolved for U.S. firms, they have not been resolved for privatizations that are subject to the 
additional problems of scarce data and the lack of liquid markets. Nevertheless, the fact that most of 
the studies of long run returns following privatizations, using different methodologies and focusing on 
different countries, find similar results lessens some of the methodological concerns.  
We discuss fifteen studies that examine the returns earned by investors who buy and hold 
privatization share issues, and the number of such studies appears to be growing rapidly. The papers 
are summarized in Table 9. Eight of these focus on either a single country or a single market for 
issues, and the other seven examine multi-national samples. Levis (1993) and Menyah, Paudyal, and 
Inganyete (1995) examine the British experience and both document significantly positive long-run 
abnormal returns for SIP investors. However, Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez (1993) find the 
opposite result for their sample of nine Chilean SIPs. Jelic and Briston (2000a) find that 25 Hungarian 
PIPOs yield large but insignificantly positive long-run returns (peaking at 21.3 percent in month 15), 
though they do find that these cumulative returns are significantly higher than the highly negative 
returns (reaching –70 percent by month 30) earned on 24 private-sector IPOs. These same authors 
(2000b) document significantly positive 1, 3, and 5-year excess returns for Polish PIPOs, but 
Ausenegg (2000) finds insignificant long-term returns for essentially the same sample. Given the 
differing estimation methodologies employed in these two studies, it is not clear whether Polish 
PIPOs earn significantly higher long-run returns than IPOs. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find 
insignificant long-run returns for privatization stocks listing in the U.S. in the form of American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) compared to local benchmarks. The returns are significantly negative 
compared to U.S. benchmarks. Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) find that investors earn 
insignificant long-term returns on 18 Malaysian PIPOs, as well as on 77 private-sector IPOs.  (See 
table #9) 
Two of the multi-national studies described in Table 9 focus on long-run returns earned by 
investors in SIPs from developing countries. A third examines only western European offerings. 
Boubakri and Cosset (1999b) study returns from 120 SIPs from 26 developing countries, while 
Perotti and Oijen (2000) develop and test a model of long-term returns using data from 20 developing 
nations. Both studies document large, highly significant long-run returns, though the mean 112 
percent 3-year return found by Boubakri and Cosset is not significant once the returns from national 
markets over the corresponding time periods are subtracted (the absolute returns are converted into   49
market-adjusted, or excess returns). This is primarily due to the extremely large weightings that SIPs 
themselves have in most developing-country national stock market indices. Once these size biases are 
accounted for, SIPs significantly out-perform most national market indices. Perotti and Oijen 
document significantly positive market-adjusted returns, and argue that this results from a progressive 
resolution of political risk as governments refrain from expropriating investors’ wealth in privatized 
firms—as had been feared. Their proxy for political risk declines by an average of 3.6 percent 
annually during the course of a privatization program, and this leads to positive excess returns for 
SIPs of about 6 percent per year. Davidson (1998) documents that large European SIPs began to out-
perform market indices in five countries during the mid-1990s. However, these SIPs did so only after 
an extended period of sub-par performance. 
The remaining four long-run return studies employ multi-national samples that cover a large 
number of countries and regions. For this reason, and because all the studies are recent enough to 
employ state-of-the-art techniques for computing net-of-market returns, we consider these the most 
persuasive evidence on long term excess returns earned by SIP investors. Megginson, Nash, Netter, 
and Schwartz (2000) examine the long-run buy-and-hold returns earned by domestic, international, 
and U.S. investors who purchase shares at the first open-market price in 158 share issue privatizations 
(SIPs) from 33 countries during the period 1981-1997. They use several benchmarks and compute 
one, three, and five-year local currency and US dollar net returns with respect to domestic, 
international, US market indices, and industry-matched comparison samples.  They find statistically 
significant positive net returns for the 158 unseasoned SIPs for all holding periods and versus all 
benchmarks. Boardman and Laurin (2000), Choi, Nam and Ryu (2000) and Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2000) find similar results. All four studies document significantly positive market-adjusted returns 
over holding periods of up to five years. In general, British privatizations yield higher long-run returns 
than do non-U.K. initial and seasoned SIPs, and British utilities yield the highest returns among the 
U.K. offerings. However, the net return is significantly positive for most non-U.K. sub-samples as 
well. These studies, and those cited earlier, support the conclusion that the average long-term, 
market-adjusted return earned by international investors in share issue privatizations is economically 
and significantly positive. Apart from Perotti and Oijen, however, few of these studies can offer any 
convincing explanation of precisely why SIP issues out-perform over time, and isolating one or more 
specific cause-and-effect relationships is likely to prove extremely difficult. Most likely, these excess   50
returns result from a gradual resolution of uncertainty on the part of investors regarding both the 
micro-economic success of privatization programs and the ability of governments to resist the 
temptation to expropriate shareholder wealth in privatized firms through direct intervention, or 
through targeted regulation or taxation.  If so, an important implication is that returns on SIPs are 
likely to be much lower in the future than they have been historically, since investors will no longer 
demand a political risk premium to purchase shares. 
 
7.  Privatization’s Impact on Financial Market Development 
7.1. The Impact of Privatization on Stock Market Capitalization and Trading 
There is no doubt that privatization has had a major impact on capital markets. Table 10 
describes the growth in the total market capitalization, and in the value of shares traded, on the 
world’s stock exchanges from 1983 to 1999. This was a period of rapid growth in the capitalization 
of markets in every country except Japan, which suffered a four-year, 70 percent decline in total 
market capitalization after reaching a value of $4.4 trillion in 1989. At year-end 1999, Japan’s market 
was eight times as valuable in dollar terms (and less than four times as valuable in yen terms) as it was 
in 1983. By contrast, total world market capitalization increased over ten-fold (to $35.0 trillion) 
between 1983 and 1999, and the total capitalization of the U.S. market increased almost nine-fold 
(from $1.9 trillion to $16.6 trillion) over the same period. The growth in markets outside the United 
States was even greater. It is also in these markets where privatization’s impact has been greatest, 
since there have been only two significant SIPs in the United States in the modern era (Conrail in 
1987 and U.S. Enrichment Corporation in 1999). Between 1983 and 1999, the total capitalization of 
non-U.S. stock markets increased from $1.49 trillion to $18.36 trillion. The total market 
capitalization of developing country stock exchanges increased by 26 times during these sixteen years, 
even after declining significantly from 1997’s peak value of $2.5 trillion to $2.2 trillion in 1999. (See 
table #10) 
Though the rise in market capitalization has been impressive, trading volumes have increased 
even more. The total value of shares traded worldwide between 1983 and 1999 rose from $1.2 trillion 
to more than $37.5 trillion. As before, non-U.S. markets experienced the greatest increases. The value 
of shares traded on markets in developing countries rose from $25 billion in 1983 to more than $2.3 
trillion in 1999. This rise in market liquidity was probably due in large part to the increasing   51
popularity of “emerging market” investing among western investors, particularly institutional 
investors such as pension and mutual funds.  
What role has privatization played in this remarkable growth in market capitalization and 
trading volume? At the end of 1983, the total market capitalization of the handful of British, Chilean, 
and Singaporean firms that had been privatized was less than $50 billion. By the middle of 1999, the 
153 privatized firms listed in either the Business Week “Global 1000” ranking of the most valuable 
companies in developed-nation stock markets or the Business Week “Top 200 Emerging Market 
Companies” ranking had a total market capitalization of $2.44 trillion. This equals approximately 10 
percent of the combined market capitalization of the firms on the two lists, and is more than 21 
percent of the non-U.S. total. (American firms accounted for 494 of the Global 1000 firms, and $11.3 
trillion of the $19.7 trillion Global 1000 total capitalization.) 
An examination of the historical evolution of non-U.S. stock markets since 1980 suggests that 
large SIPs played a key role in the growth of capital markets almost everywhere, especially because 
they are generally among the largest firms in national markets. Using the Business Week 1999 Global 
1000 and Top 200 data, Table 11 details the total market value and relative size of the world’s 25 
most valuable privatized firms. Columns 1 and 2 give the company names and domicile countries. 
Column 3 shows each firm’s ranking in the Global 1000 list (firms from the Emerging Market list are 
given the ranking they would have if included in the Global 1000 ranking). Column 4 gives the firm’s 
ranking within its home market, and column 5 lists the firm’s total market capitalization. Column 6 
expresses the single firm’s market capitalization as a percentage of the entire national market’s year-
end 1998 capitalization.  (See table #11) 
Table 11 plus data reported in Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) reveal the relative 
importance of SIPs in most non-U.S. stock exchanges. Privatized firms are the most valuable 
companies in Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Australia, Mexico, Singapore, China, 
Denmark, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Taiwan, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Malaysia, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Venezuela, and Pakistan, and they 
are the second most valuable firms in many other countries, including Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, 
the Netherlands, and Israel. Privatized companies are the first and second most valuable companies in 
eleven countries, including Japan, Britain, Singapore, and Korea, and they occupy the three top slots 
in Italy, Portugal, Russia, and Argentina. Table 11 also shows that the largest privatized firms often   52
account for sizeable fractions of the total capitalization of national stock markets, even in advanced 
countries such as Germany (10.5 percent), Italy (11.8 percent), Spain (14.8 percent), and Australia 
(19.4 percent). In developing countries such as Singapore (15.8 percent), Korea (17.2 percent), and 
Mexico (36.3 percent), individual privatized firms also account for large fractions of the total market 
capitalization. 
Another way to measure the impact of privatized firms on capital market development is to see how 
important SIPs have been as security offerings, and here the impact is even greater. As Table 12 
shows, the 10 largest, and 30 of the 35 largest, share offerings in history have been privatizations. Ten 
SIPs have been larger than the biggest U.S. share offering, the $10.6 billion ATT Wireless tracking 
stock offering in April 2000. Jones et al. (1999) show that, between 1984 and 1997, 112 SIPs raised 
at least $1 billion, a stock offering size rarely observed in the United States. Twenty-five SIPs have 
raised more than $7 billion, a feat no private-sector issuer achieved prior to April 2000, and 
governments have raised a total of more than $700 billion through some 750 public share offerings 
since 1977. Outside of the entire U.S. corporate sector, this is an unprecedented volume of common 
equity issuance, and it has fundamentally changed the nature of global stock market trading and 
investment. (See table #12) 
Why should we care about privatization’s impact on the development of capital markets? 
Obviously, new share listings can directly create some net new wealth and a handful of new (albeit 
well-paying) jobs, but the principal economic payoff from increasingly efficient and liquid capital 
markets comes from the financing opportunities and monitoring possibilities they provide.  As 
documented in Levine (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and 
Henry (2000a,b), among others, efficient capital markets promote economic growth and allow 
individual firms to fund investment opportunities they otherwise would have to forgo. Therefore, 
privatization deserves credit for whatever direct role it has played in promoting stock market 
development (through new share offerings), and for the indirect role it has played in bond market 
development. This catalytic role can be assumed because several of the aforementioned studies find 
development of one market also promotes development of related markets. 
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8. Privatization’s Impact on International Corporate Governance Practices 
It would be an understatement to assert that interest in corporate governance issues has been 
growing recently among policy-makers and academic economists. A nation’s corporate governance 
system can be defined as the set of laws, institutions, practices, and regulations that determine how 
limited-liability companies will be run and in whose interest. Evidence of the professional interest in 
corporate governance is not hard to find. Several countries and multilateral agencies have recently 
published “codes” or “principles” of good corporate governance practices, such as OECD (1999), 
and many survey articles examining international corporate governance have been written during the 
past five years. These studies have examined governance practices in developed countries (Mayer, 
1996, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Maher and Andersson, 1999, Dyck, 2000b and Megginson, 2000), 
transition economies (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999, Coffee, 1999, and Dyck, 2000a), and 
individual countries such as Russia (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000) and China (Xu and 
Wang, 1997 and Lin, 2000). These surveys conclude that developing an effective method of 
protecting the rights of outside investors—especially shareholders—is a prerequisite for developing a 
modern financial system that can provide external capital for growing firms. 
There are several reasons why corporate governance has suddenly risen to prominence. These 
include the large increase in the total value of security issues on global capital markets, and a 
comparable increase in the total value of mergers and acquisitions worldwide.
36  Until recently, relying 
on securities markets for corporate financing and resorting to (often hostile) public takeovers to effect 
changes in control of corporate assets were American practices, but both trends have now “gone 
global.” In particular, the adoption of the euro in January 1999 caused the value of European mergers 
and acquisitions to roughly double to $1.22 trillion in 1999 versus 1998 (itself a record year). Another 
reason for the interest in corporate governance today is the important role that poor governance 
practices are perceived to have played in the East Asian economic contraction that began in July 1997 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Long, 2000 and Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000). Finally, 
academic research by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) and others shows that corporate governance generally, 
and corporate legal systems specifically, significantly influence capital market size, ownership 
                                                 
36  The data are taken from the Investment Dealers Digest. Each January, IDD details the prior year’s 
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structure, and efficiency. Industrialized-country governments that implement large-scale SIP 
programs often need to significantly change their corporate governance systems, but governments 
from the transition economies of China and Central and Eastern Europe must create such a system 
almost from scratch. One of the distinctive aspects of SIP programs is the tendency of governments to 
sell shares to large numbers of citizens, often one million or more. Democratic governments are 
usually acutely aware of the political fall-out that could result if small investors suffer losses on their 
SIP investments because of inadequate shareholder protection or insider dealings. Thus, at the same 
time they launch the first large SIPs, most governments establish (or augment) a regulatory body 
similar to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Since utilities comprise many of the 
important privatizations and since many utilities are natural monopolies, most privatizing governments 
establish regulatory bodies for these firms as well. In addition, national stock exchanges are often 
illiquid and non-transparent at the beginning of large SIP programs. Governments must establish the 
listing and other regulations that will assure potential investors that the market is a reputable place to 
invest and trade. 
There is some literature that examines the actual corporate governance provisions of 
privatized firms. Jones et al. (1999) find that governments tend to retain some sort of decisive voting 
rights in privatized firms even after a majority of the income rights have been sold. In many countries, 
the government retains a golden share, with 90 percent of U.K. SIPs having such a feature. This 
special share held by the government enables it to veto mergers, liquidations, asset sales, and other 
major corporate events. An alternative method of retaining ultimate control is for the government to 
insert some control restrictions directly into the SIP’s charter.  
8.1. Individual Share Ownership in Privatized Companies 
Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) study the evolution of share ownership in large SIPs. 
They look at how many individual stockholders are created in a sample of large privatization share 
offerings, as well as how these highly atomistic ownership structures evolve over time. They compare 
the numbers of stockholders in the privatized firms in the 1999 Business Week Global 1000 and Top 
200 Emerging Market lists to capitalization-matched private sector firms from the same markets, 
obtaining useable data for 97 of the 153 privatized companies and for 99 of the matching privately-
owned firms. For most of the cases with data available for both the privatized and the matching firm, 
the privatized company has a larger number of shareholders. This result holds despite the fact that in   55
most cases governments retain sizable stakes in these firms, thus reducing their effective total 
capitalization since these stakes have not yet been sold to private investors. Boutchkova and 
Megginson conclude that the number of shareholders in the privatized companies is significantly 
higher than the number of shareholders in the matching private-sector (non-privatized) sample 
companies. 
Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) also examine how the total number of shareholders in a 
company evolves during the years subsequent to a SIP. They demonstrate that the extremely large 
numbers of shareholders created by many SIPs are not a stable pattern of corporate ownership. Figure 
3 shows the dynamics in share ownership in privatized firms. For SIPs with less than 100,000 initial 
investors, the number of shareholders increases steadily from one year to four years after the 
privatization. However, for the 39 SIPs that initially have more than 100,000 shareholders, the total 
number of shareholders declines steadily. The total number of shareholders in the largest 
privatizations (those with 500,000 or more initial investors) declines by 33 percent within five years of 
the share offering. (See figure #3) 
The implications of this finding for government efforts to develop an effective corporate 
governance system or equity culture are unclear. Many new stockholders do not retain the shares they 
purchase. Other evidence suggests that retail investors in privatizations generally own only that one 
stock, hardly indicative of a class of well-diversified stockholders. On the other hand, since the long-
run returns to investors in SIPs are generally positive, the first experience of these new retail investors 
in stock market trading is a positive one. Furthermore, the fact that governments are able to entice 
large numbers of investors to return for subsequent share offerings suggests that these programs are 
indeed creating (at least minimally) effective governance systems and stock markets capable of 
absorbing large new stock issues. 
 
9.  The “Lessons” of Privatization Research 
9.1  Some Thoughts on the Current Literature 
Our reading of the extant literature on privatization suggests the following conclusions:   
1. The privatization programs of the last 20 years have significantly reduced the role of state-
owned enterprises in the economic life of most countries. Most of this reduction has happened   56
in developing countries only during the 1990s. The SOE share of “global GDP” has declined 
from more than ten percent in 1979 to less than six percent today.
37  
2. Research now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and 
more profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms. There is limited empirical 
evidence, especially from China, that suggests that non-privatizing reform measures, such as 
price deregulation, market liberalization and increased use of incentives, can improve the 
efficiency of SOEs, but it also seems likely that these reforms would be even more effective if 
coupled with privatization.  
3. Governments use three basic techniques to privatize their SOEs: share issue privatizations 
(SIPs), asset sales, and voucher or mass privatizations. We are beginning to understand the 
determinants of the method selected in specific circumstances. However, there is great 
variation within all the techniques, because privatization is a complex process involving a host 
of political and economic factors. Voucher privatizations are the least economically 
productive divestment technique, but those governments that use it generally feel they have 
few other realistic options. 
4. Governments attempt to craft the offering terms of SIPs to balance competing economic, 
political, and financial objectives. Most governments underprice share offerings (particularly 
initial offerings) and then use targeted share allocations to favor domestic over foreign 
investors. SOE employees are particularly favored, receiving preferential allocations in 91 
percent of offers. Governments frequently retain golden shares that give them veto power 
over certain control changes, and also insert various other control restrictions into the 
corporate charters of privatized firms. 
5. We know that privatization “works,” in the sense that divested firms almost always become 
more efficient, more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, and become 
financially healthier. These results hold for both transition and non-transition economies, 
though the results vary more in the transition economies. The question of whether 
privatization generally costs at least some SOE workers their jobs is still unresolved. The 
                                                 
37  These figures are based on the study findings discussed in Section 2, and on the observation that 
OECD countries represent about three-quarters of world GDP and developing countries account for the remaining 
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answer is ultimately based on whether sales increase faster than productivity in privatized 
firms. Most studies find that employment in privatized firms usually does fall, though three 
large-sample studies document employment increases. What is clear is that whenever 
employment is cut, there is almost invariably a large compensating performance improvement. 
Several studies also highlight the need to bring new entrepreneurial management into 
privatized firms to maximize performance improvements. However, there is little empirical 
evidence on how privatization affects consumers. 
6. Investors who purchase initial SIP shares at the offering price and then sell those shares at the 
first post-issue trading price earn significantly positive excess (market-adjusted) returns. 
Additionally, there is now convincing evidence that initial returns on privatization IPOs are 
significantly higher than the initial returns earned on private-sector IPOs. Investors who 
purchase privatization IPO shares at their first post-offer trading price, and then retain those 
shares for one-, three-, or five-year holding periods, also earn significantly positive net 
returns.  
7. Though it is difficult to pinpoint causality, it appears that countries that have launched large-
scale SIP programs have experienced rapid growth in their national stock market 
capitalization and trading volume. Countries (other than the United States) that have either 
not launched major privatization programs or have emphasized asset sales and vouchers over 
public share offerings appear to lag behind in market development. Privatized firms are one of 
the two or three most valuable companies in most non-U.S. markets, and the 10 largest (and 
30 of the 35 largest) share issues in financial history have all been privatizations. 
8. Emerging (largely anecdotal) evidence suggests that adopting a large-scale SIP program is 
often a major spur to modernizing a nation’s corporate governance system. Transition 
economies that launch privatization programs must create such systems largely from scratch, 
and the record of success here is decidedly mixed. Many governments try to develop an equity 
culture among their citizenry through SIP programs, also with mixed results. Share ownership 
has dramatically increased in most non-transition countries over the past 15 years, but the 
share ownership patterns that are created when SIPs are sold to large numbers of investors 
(often one million or more) are not stable. However, it seems clear that privatization   58
programs lead to significant improvements in securities market regulation, information 
disclosure rules, and other required components of modern financial systems. 
9.2. Avenues for Further Research 
While much has indeed been learned about the effectiveness of privatization as a political and 
economic policy, there are several important areas that need further research. We believe that, in 
particular, there are three aspects of privatization that need to be understood much better for public 
policy reasons.  First, researchers need to more closely examine the sequencing and staging of 
privatization, and conclusively document whether reforms other than government divestiture can 
effectively serve as a substitute (or precursor) for privatization. Responsible policy-makers are 
understandably reluctant to “bet their economies” on a rapid, and essentially irreversible, privatization 
program without some assurance that all necessary prerequisite policies have been put into place. 
Until these policies are identified, and the interactions between different various policy options are 
established, launching large-scale privatization programs will remain a leap of faith. 
The second vital area of research is to conclusively document the labor economics of 
privatization programs. Do most such programs actually cost SOE worker jobs? Are there gender-
specific impacts relating to the total commercialization of state-owned enterprises, as might happen if 
privatization caused SOEs to shut down child care or other social services? Are worker 
training/retraining programs effective methods of dealing with worker redundancies, or should 
governments emphasize lump-sum severance packages when lay-offs are required? Do privatization 
programs create more jobs economy-wide than they destroy? These questions are not only vitally 
important to policy-makers, they are inherently interesting in their own right. 
Finally, what role can privatization play in equipping companies and countries to meet the 
challenges posed by major economic forces such as globalization and the rapid growth of information-
based business? Technological breakthroughs have transformed the global telecommunications 
industry during the past decade, and privatized telecom companies have been at the forefront of this 
revolution. Indeed, it is unlikely that this most dynamic of industries would have been able to grow 
nearly as rapidly under the former state ownership model. But how important will privatization be for 
the global oil and gas industry’s development in the future, and for the energy-based utilities that are 
now being impacted by technological and regulatory changes similar to those that hit 
telecommunications during the 1990s? How can developing countries structure privatization   59
programs to most effectively attract foreign direct investment from multinational companies? How 
will privatization impact the worldwide shift from commercial bank-based systems of corporate 
finance to capital market-based finance? All of these are questions can, and should, be answered using 
the tools of economic analysis, and it is hard to imagine an area of research more intrinsically 
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Table 1: Summary of Recent Empirical Studies Comparing Public Versus Private Ownership 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 
Summary of empirical findings and conclusions  
Boardman and 
Vining (1989) 
Examine the economic performance 500 largest non - US firms 
in 1983, classified by ownership structure as state- owned, 
privately- owned, or mixed ownership enterprises (ME). 
Employ four profitability ratios and two measures of X -
efficiency.  
Find that state- owned and mixed ownership firms are significantly 
less profitable and productive than privately- owned companies. 
Al so find mixed ownership firms are no more profitable than pure 
state- owned companies—so full private ownership required to 




Asks whether ownership “matters” in determining the efficiency 
of SOEs, or if only the d egree of competition is important. 
Estimate performance model using 1986 data from 500 largest 
non - financial Canadian companies—including 12 SOEs and 93 
mixed enterprises. 
After controlling for size, market share and other factors, private 
firms are significantly more profitable and efficient than are MEs 
and SOEs, though now find that MEs out - perform Crown 
corporations (SOEs). Thus, ownership has an effect separable 
from competition alone. 
Pinto, Belka and 
Krajewski 
(1993) 
Test whether privatization is required to improve performance 
of SOEs by examining how Polish state sector responded in the 
three years following the “Big Bang” reforms of January 1990. 
These liberalized prices, tightened fiscal & monetary policy and 
introduced competition —but did not include privatization.  
Document significant performance improvement due to 
macroeconomic stabilization package, even without privatization. 
Improvements mostly due to imposition of hard budget constraints, 
tight bank lending policies, and enhanced credibilit y about 
government’s “no bailout” pledge. 
Ehrlich, Gallais -
Hamonno, Liu 
and Lutter (1994) 
Examine impact of state ownership on the long- run rate of 
productivity growth and/or cost decline for 23 international 
airlines over the period 1973- 1983. 
Find that  state ownership can lower the long- run annual rate of 
productivity growth by 1.6- 2.0% and the rate of unit cost decline 




Using industry - level survey data, evaluates the  performance 
differences between SOEs, MEs, and privately- owned Indian 
companies for the period 1973- 1989. SOEs and MEs account 
for 37% of employment and 66% of capital investment in India 
in 1989. 
Document efficiency scores averaging 0.975 for privately- ow ned 
firms, which are significantly higher than the average 0.912 for 
MEs and 0.638 for SOEs. State sector efficiency improves during 
concerted “efficiency drives” but declines afterwards. 
Kole and 
Mulherin (1997) 
Test whether postwar performance of 17 fir ms partly owned by 
US government due to seizure of “enemy” property during 
WWII differs significantly from performance of private US 
Though these firms experience abnormally high turnover among 
boards of directors, tenure of managers is stable, and  SOE 
performance is not significantly different from privately - owned  
 
WWII differs significantly from performance of private US 
firms. 




Test whether profitability, labor intensity, and debt levels of 
SOEs in the lists of the 500 largest non - US firms during 1975, 
1985, and 1995 differs  from privately- owned firms in the same 
lists. 
After controlling for business cycles, find private firms are 
significantly (often dramatically) more profitable than SOEs. 
Private firms also have significantly less debt and less labor 




Using data from 92 countries, examine whether government 
ownership of banks impacts level of financial system 
development, rate of economic growth, and growth rate of 
productivity.  
Find government ownership is extensive, especially in poorest 
countries, that these holdings retard financial system development, 
and restrict economic growth rates, mostly due to impact on 
productivity.  
Tian (2000)  Studies relation between state shareholding and corporate 
performance of 825 publicly- traded Chinese companies in 
1998.  413 of these had some government ownership, 312 had 
none. 
Find performance of “private” enterprises to be significantly 
superior to that of “mixed” enterprises. Also find corporate value 
generally declines with state ownership, but then increases after 
state share passes 45%.  
 
Table 2: Pricing, Share Allocation, and Control Allocation Patterns in Share Issue Privatizations  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table provides summary statistics on pricing, share allocation, and control allocation patterns for a sample of 
630 share issue privatizations (SIPs) executed by 59 national governments during the period 1977- 1997. Measures 
are broken down for the 417 initial public offerings of SIP shares and the 213 seasoned SIP offerings. Pricing 
variables include Initial return (also known as initial underpricing), which is a measure of one - day return an 
investor who purchased shares at the offering price could earn by reselling those shares at the end of the first day’s 
trading; Percent of offers at a fixed price, which measures the fraction of an issue offered to investors at a pre-
determined, fixed price r ather than at an auction - determined price; and  Cost of sales as a percent of issue size is a 
measure of the sum of cash expenses and underwriter discount charged by the investment banking syndicate 
managing the issue. The  Share allocation variables measure the fraction of an issue specifically allocated to 
employees and foreigners, while the  Control allocation variables describe how corporate control is parceled out 
as a result of the offering. Percent of capital sold measures the fraction of a firm’s total  common equity (which is 
not necessarily synonymous with total voting rights) sold in an offering.  
                  Initial SIPS                                   Seasoned Offers               
Measure           Mean   Median   Number   Mean   Median   Number  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pricing Variables 
    Issue size (US$ million)      555.7            104.0     417   1,068.9     311.0     172 
    Initial return            34.1        12.4     242          9.4         3.3       55 
    Percent of offer at fixed price           85.0      100.0     273        61.0     100.0       77 
    Cost of sales as a percent of issue    4.4           3.3     178          2.5         2.6       61 
Share Allocation Variables 
    Percent of offer allocated          8.5           7.0     255          4.8         2.6       76 
to employees 
    Fractio n of offers with some         91.0                 255        65.8           76 
allocation to employees 
    Percent of offer allocated      28.4             11.5     348        35.9       32.5      142 
to foreigners 
    Percent of offers with some              57.1           348        67.6          142 
allocation to foreigners  
Control Allocation Variables 
    Percent of capital sold in offer      43.9       35.0     384       22.7       18.1     154 
    Percent of offers where 100%      11.5           384            0         154 
of capital sold    
    Percent of  capital where 50%      28.9                 384       8.4         154 
or more of capital sold  
 
-Source:  Jones, et al (1999).   
 
Table 3: Summary of Case Study and Country and Industry -Specific Empirical Studies of Privatization: Non -Transition Economies 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table summarizes the sample selection criteria, methodologies, and empirical  findings of several recent academic studies of privatization that focus on 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 





Compare actual post- privatization performance of 12 large 
firms (mostly airlines and regulated utilities) in Britain, Chile, 
Malaysia, and Mexico to predicted performance of these firms 
had they remained SOEs.  
Document net welfare gains in 11 of the 12 cases which equal, on 
average, 26% of the firms’ pre- divestiture sales. Find no case 
where workers were made worse off, and 3 where workers were 
made significantly better off.   
Martin & Parker 
(1995) 
Using two  measures (ROR on capital employed and annual 
growth in value - added per employee- hour), examine whether 
11 British firms privatized during 1981- 88 improved 
performance after divestment. Also attempt to control for 
business cycle effects. 
Mixed results. Out right performance improvements after 
privatization found in less than half of firm - measures studied. 
Several improved prior to divestiture, indicating an initial “shake-
out” effect upon privatization announcement. 
Ramamurti 
(1996) 
Surveys studies of 4 tel ecom, two airline, and one toll- road 
privatization programs in Latin America during period 1987-
1991.  Also discusses political economic issues, methods used 
to overcome bureaucratic, ideological opposition to divestiture. 
Concludes privatization very posi tive for telecoms, partly due to 
scope for technology, capital investment, and attractiveness of 
offer terms. Much less scope for productivity improvements for 
airlines and roads, and little improvement observed. 
Boles de Boer 
and Evans (1996) 
Estimates t he impact of the 1987 deregulation, and 1990 
privatization, of Telecom New Zealand on the price and quality 
of telephone services. Also examine whether investors 
benefited.  
Document significant declines in price of phone services, due 
mostly to productivity growth that cut costs at a 5.6% annual rate, 
and significant improvement in service levels. Shareholders also 
benefited significantly.  
Petrazzini and 
Clark (1996) 
Using International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data 
through 1994, test whether deregulation and privatization 
impact the level and growth in teledensity (main lines per 100 
people), prices, service quality, and employment by telecoms in 
26 developing countries.  
Deregulation and privatization both are associated with significant 
improvemen ts in level and growth in teledensity, but have no 
consistent impact on service quality. Deregulation associated with 




Examines restructuring and privatization o f Ferrocarilla 
Argentinos, the national railroad, in 1990. Tests whether 
productivity, employment, and need for operating subsidies 
Documents a 370% improvement in labor productivity and  a 
78.7% decline in employment (from 92,000 to 19,682). Services 
were expanded and improved, and delivered at lower cost to  
 
(equal to 1% of GDP in 1990) change significantly after 
divestiture. 
consumers. Need for operating subsidies largely eliminated. 
Eckel, Eckel, and 
Singal (1997) 
Examine the effect of British Airways’ p rivatization on the stock 
prices of competitors. Also tests whether fares on competitive 
routes decline after privatization. Such findings would suggest a 
more competitive BA resulting from privatization.  
Stock prices of US competitors decline on average by 7 percent 
upon BA’s privatization, and fares on routes served by BA and 
competitors fall by 14.3 percent after divestiture. Compensation of 




Perform a cost- benef it analysis of the 1990 restructuring and 
privatization of the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB). Compare the actual performance of the privatized 
firms to a counter- factual assuming CEGB had remained state-
owned. 
The restructuring/privatization  of CEGB was “worth it,” in that 
there is a permanent cost reduction of 5 percent per year. 
Producers and shareholders capture all this benefit and more. 
Consumers and the government lose. Also show that alternative 
fuel purchases involve unnecessarily high costs and wealth flows 
out of the country.  
Ros (1999)   Uses ITU data and panel data regression methodology to 
examine the effects of privatization and competition on network 
expansion and efficiency in 110 countries over the period 
1986- 1995.  
Finds that countries with at least 50% private ownership of main 
telecom firm have significantly higher teledensity levels and growth 
rates. Both privatization and competition increase efficiency, but 
only privatization is positively associated with network expansio n.  
LaPorta and 
López - de- Silanes 
(1999) 
Tests whether performance of 218 SOEs privatized through 
June 1992 improves after divestment. Compares performance 
with industry - matched firms, and splits improvements 
documented between industry and firm - specific influences. 
Output of privatized firms increased 54.3%, while employment 
declined by half (though wages for remaining workers increased). 
Firms achieved a 24% point increase in operating profitability, 
eliminating need for subsidies equal to 12.7% of GDP. Hi gher 
product prices explain 5% of improvement; transfers from laid - off 
workers, 31%, and incentive - related productivity gains account for 
remaining 64%. 
Wallsten (2000a)  Performs an econometric analysis of the effects of 
telecommunications reforms in deve loping countries. Using a 
panel dataset of 30 African and Latin American countries from 
1984 to 1997, explores the effects of privatization, competition 
and regulation on telecommunications performance. 
Competition is significantly associated with increases in per capita 
access and decreases in cost. Privatization alone is not helpful, 
unless coupled with effective, independent regulation. Increasing 
competition the single best reform, competition with privatization is 
best,  but privatizing a monopoly with out regulatory reforms should 
be avoided. 
Laurin and Bozec 
(2000) 
Compares productivity and profitability of two large Canadian 
rail carriers, before and after the 1995 privatization of Canadian 
National (CN). Compares accounting ratios for entire 17 - year  
Total factor productivity of CN much lower than that of privately-
owned Canadian Pacific (CP) during 1981- 91 period, but became 
just as efficient during pre - privatization (1992 - 9 5) period, then  
 
National (CN). Compares accounting ratios for entire 17- year 
period 1981- 1997 and for three sub - periods: the fully state-
owned era (1981- 91), the pre- privatization period (1992- 95), 
and the post- privatization era. Also compares stock returns 
from 1995- 98. Creates a six- firm comparison group of 
Canadian privatizatio ns, and computes accounting ratios and 
stock returns for these firms as well.  
just as efficient during pre- privatization (1992- 95) period, then 
exceeded it after 1995. CN stock price out - performed CP, the 
transportation industry, and the Canadian market after 1995. Both 
firms shed workers after 1992, but CN’s employment declined by 
more (34% vs 18%) as average productivity almost d oubled (97% 
increase). CN’s capital spending increased significantly, though CP 
increased more. Six- firm Canadian privatization comparison group 
also experienced significant increases in investment spending and 
productivity, and a significant decline in em ployment. 
Boylaud and 
Nicoletti (2000) 
Uses factor analysis and a database on market structure and 
regulation to investigate the effects of liberalization and 
privatization on productivity, prices and quality of long- distance 
and cellular telephony servic es in 23 OECD countries over the 
1991- 97 period. 
Prospective and actual competition both bring about productivity 
and quality improvements—and lower prices—in telecom 
services, but no clear effect could be found for privatization.   
 
Table 4: Summary of Em pirical Studies Comparing Pre Versus Post -Privatization Performance Changes for Firms Privatized Via Public 
Share Offerings: Non -Transition Economies 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table summarizes the sample selection criteria, methodologies, and empirical findings of several recent academic studies of privatization that employ 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 





Compare 3 - year average post- privatization financial and 
operating performance ratios to the 3 - year pre- privatization 
values for 61 firms from 18 countries and 32 industries from 
1961- 1989. Tests significance of median changes in post 
versus pre- privatization period. Also binomial tests for % of 
firms changing as predicted. 
Document economically & statistically significant post- privatization 
increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability, 
capital investment spending, and dividend payments, as well as 
significant decreases in leverage. No evidence of employment 
declines after privatization, but significant changes in firm directors.   
Macquieira and 
Zurita (1996)  
Compare pre-  versus post- privatization performance of 22 
Chilean companies privatized from 1984 to 1989. Use 
Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (MNR) methodology 
to perform analysis first without adjusting for overall  market 
movements (as in MNR), then with an adjustment for 
contemporaneous changes. 
Unadjusted results virtually identical to MNR: significant increases 
in output, profitability, employment, investment, and dividend 
payments. After adjusting for market move ments, however, the 
changes in output, employment, and liquidity are no longer 
significant, and leverage increases significantly.  
Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998) 
Compare 3 - year average post- privatization financial and 
operating performance ratios to the 3 - year pre- privatization 
values for 79 companies from 21 developing countries and 32 
industries over the period 1980- 1992. Tests for the 
significance of median changes in ratio values in post versus 
pre- privatization period. Also binomial tests for percentage of  
firms changing as predicted. 
Document economically & statistically significant post- privatization 
increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability, 
capital investment spending, dividend payments, and employment -
- as well as significant  decreases in leverage. Performance 
improvements are generally even larger than those documented by 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh.  
D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999)  
Document offering terms, method of sale, and ownership 
structure resulting from privati zation of 78 companies from 10 
developing and 15 developed countries over the period 1990 -
Document economically & statistically significant post- privatization 
increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, and 
profitability, as well as significant decreases in leverage. Capital  
 
94. Then compare 3 - year average post- privatization financial 
and operating performance ratios to the 3 - year pre-
privatization values for a sub - sample of 26 firms with  sufficient 
data. Tests for the significance of median changes in ratio 
values in post versus pre- privatization period. Also binomial 
tests for % of firms changing as predicted. 
investment spending increases--but insignificantly, while 
employment declines significantly. More of the firms privatized in 




Study offering terms and share ownership results for 65 banks 
fully or partially privatized from 1981 to 1996. Then compare 
pre and post- privatization performance chan ges for 32 banks 
in OECD countries and 5 in developing countries. 
Document moderate performance improvements in OECD 
countries.  Ratios proxying for profitability, fee income (non -
interest income as fraction of total), and capital adequacy increase 
significantly; leverage ratio declines significantly. Document large, 
ongoing state ownership, and significantly positive initial returns to 
IPO investors.  
Boubakri and 
Cosset (1999a) 
Examine pre-  versus post- privatization performance of 16 
African firms privatized through public share offering during the 
period 1989- 1996. Also summarize findings of three other 
studies pertaining to privatization in developing countries. 
Document significantly increased capital spending by privatized 
firms, but find only insignificant changes in profitability, efficiency, 
output and leverage.  
D’Souza and 
Megginson (2000)  
Examine pre-  versus post- privatization performance changes 
for 17 national telecommunications companies privatized 
through share offerings during 1981- 94. 
Find s that profitability, output, operating efficiency, capital 
spending, number of access lines, and average salary per 
employee all increase significantly after privatization. Leverage 
declines significantly; employment declines insignificantly.  
Dewenter a nd 
Malatesta (2000) 
Compare pre-  versus post- privatization performance of 63 
large, high- information companies divested during 1981- 94 
over both short- term [(+1 to +3) vs ( - 3 to  - 1)] and long- term 
[(+1 to +5) vs   (- 10 to - 1)] horizons. Also examine long-run 
stock return performance of privatized firms and compare the 
relative performance of a large sample (1,500 firm - years) of 
state and privately- owned firms during 1975, 1985, and 1995.   
Document significant increases in profitability (using net income) 
an d significant decreases in leverage and labor intensity 
(employees￿sales) over both short and long - term comparison 
horizons. Operating profits increase  prior to  privatization, but not 
after. Document significantly positive long- term (1- 5 years) 
abnormal stock returns, mostly concentrated in Hungary, Poland, 
and the UK. Results also strongly indicate that private firms out -
perform state- owned firms. 
Boardman, Laurin  Compare 3 - year average post - privatization financial and  Find that profitability, measured as return on sales or assets, more  
 
and Vining (2000)  operating performa nce ratios to the 5 - year pre- privatization 
values for 9 Canadian firms privatized from 1988 to 1995. 
Also computed long- run (up to 5 years) stock returns for 
divested firms. 
than doubles  after privatization, while efficiency and sales also 
increase significantly (though less drastically). Leverage and 
employment decline significantly, while capital spending increases 
significantly. Privatized firms also significantly out - perform 
Canadian stock market over all long- term holding periods. 
  
Table 5: Summarized Results From Three Empirical Studies of the Financial and Operating Performance of Newly-Privatized Firms  
(Compared to Their Performance as State -Owned Enterprises)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table summarizes the empirical results of three directly- comparable academic studies [Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998), and D’Souza and Megginson (1999)] comparing the three- year average operating and financial performance of a combined sample of 211 
newly- privatized firms with the average performance of those same firms during the ir last three years as state- owned enterprises (SOEs). All three studies 
employ the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its z - statistic) as the test of significance for the change in median value. All three studies employ multiple proxies for 
most of the economic  variables being measured; this table summarizes only one proxy per topic, and emphasizes the one highlighted in the studies (almost 
invariably, the variable that uses either physical measures--such as number of employees--or financial ratios using current - dollar measures in the numerator or 
denominator, or both). Profitability, investment, leverage, and dividend measures are in percent. Efficiency and output measures are index values, with the value 
during the year of privatization  defined as 1.000; infla tion - adjusted sales figures are used in the efficiency and output measures.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Mean value    Mean value    Mean change  Z -Statistic for    % of Firms        Z -Statistic for   
Variables and               Number   of      Before     After        Due to   Difference in  With improved    Significance of 
Studies cited       Observations    Privatization    Privatization    Privatization  Performance    Performance        % change  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
P ROFITABILITY (Net Income ÷ Sales)  
    Megginson, Nash and van            55        0.0552            0.0799               0.0249               3.15***              69.1            3.06***       
Randenborgh (1994)              (0.0442)         (0.0611)             (0.0140)  
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)      78   0.0493   0.1098   0.0605   3.16***  62.8  2.29** 
 (0.0460)  (0.0799)  (0.0181) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    78   0.14   0.17   0.03  3.92***  71  4.17*** 
 (0.05)     (0.08)  (0.03) 
       Weighted average   218
a   0.0862   0.1257   0.0396    67.6 
EFFICIENCY (Real Sales per Employee)  
    Megginson, Nash and van       51   0.956   1.062   0.1064  3.66***  85.7  6.03*** 
         Randenborgh (1994)    (0.942) (1.055)  (0.1157) 
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    56   0.9224   1.1703   0.2479  4.79***  80.4  4.60*** 
(0.9056)  (1.1265)  (0.2414) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    63   1.02   1.23   0.21  4.87***  79  5.76*** 
(0.87)  (1.16)  (0.29) 
        Weighted average  170   0.9733   1.1599   0.1914    81.5 
INVESTMENT (Capital Expenditures ÷ Sales)  
    Megginson, Nash and van          43   0.1169   0.1689   0.0521  2.35**   67.4  2.44** 
         Randenborgh (1994)    (0.0668)  (0.1221)  (0.0159)  
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    48   0.1052   0.2375   0.1322  2.28**  62.5  1.74* 
(0.0649)  (0.1043)  (0.0137) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    66   0.18   0.17   - 0.01  0.80  55  0.81 
(011)  (0.10)  (- 0.01) 
         Weighted average  154   0.1405   0.1900   0.0493    60.6 
OUTPUT (Real Sales (adjusted by CPI)) 
    Megginson, Nash and van     57   0.899   1.140   0.241  4.77***  75.4  4.46*** 
         Randenborgh (1994)    (0.890)  (1.105)   (0.190) 
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    78   0.9691   1.220   0.2530  5.19***  75.6  4.58*** 
(0.9165)   (1.123)   (0.1892) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    85   0.93   2.70   1.76  7.30***  88  10.94*** 
(0.76)   (1.86)   (1.11) 
          Weighted average  209
a   0.9358   1.7211   0.8321    80.3 
EMPLOYMENT (Total Employees)  
    Megginson, Nash and van     39   40,850   43,200   2,346  0.96  64.1  1.84* 
         Randenborgh (1994)     (19,360)   (23,720)   (276)   
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    57   10,672   10,811   139  1.48  57.9  1.19 
 (3,388)   (3,745)   (104) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    66   22,941   22,136   - 805  - 1.62  36  - 2.14** 
 (9,876)   (9,106)   (- 770) 
          Weighted average  162   22,936   23,222    286    49.5 
LEVERAGE (Total Debt ÷ Total Assets)  
    Megginson, Nash and van     53    0.6622   0.6379   - 0.0243  - 2.41**  71.7  3.51*** 
         Randenborgh (1994)     (0.7039)  (0.6618)   (- 0.0234)   
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    65   0.5495   0.4986   - 0.0508  - 2.48**  63.1  2.11** 
 (0.5575)  (0.4789)   (- 0.0162) 
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    72   0.29   0.23   - 0.06  - 3.08***  67  3.05*** 
 (0.26) (0.18)   (- 0.08) 
           Weighted average  188   0.4826  0.4357   -0.0469    67.0 
DIVIDENDS (Cash Dividends ÷ Sales)  
    Megginson, Nash and van     39   0.0128   0.0300   0.0172  4.63***  89.7  8.18*** 
         Rand enborgh (1994)    (0.0054)  (0.0223)   (0.0121) 
    Boubakri & Cosset (1998)    67   0.0284   0.0528   0.0244  4.37***  76.1  4.28*** 
 (0.0089)  (0.0305)   (0.0130)  
    D’Souza & Megginson (1999)    51   0.015   0.04    0.025  4.98***  79  5.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.02)   (0.02) 
           Weighted average  106   0.0202   0.0655   0.0228    80.4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
a      Number exc eeds 211 because of overlapping firms in different samples. 
***  Indicates significance at the 1 percent level  
**    Indicates significance at the 5 percent level  
*      Indicates significance at the 10 percent level   
 
Table 6: Summary of Empirical Studies of Privatization In Transition Economies: Central and Eastern Europe  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 




Examines determinants of performance improvements for 
sample of 706 Czech firms privatized during 1992- 95. Using 
Tobins - Q, tests whether concentrated ownership structure or 
presence of outside monitor (ban k or investment fund) 
improves Q more than dispersed ownership.  
Document that privatized firms do prosper, primarily because of 
the concentrated ownership structure that results. Find the more 
concentrated the post- privatization ownership structure the higher 
is the firm’s profitability and market valuation. Large stakes owned 
by bank - sponsored funds and strategic investors are particularly 




Compare the extent of restructuring achieved by over 6 ,300 
private and state- owned firms in seven eastern European 
countries during 1992- 95. Use six measures to examine which 
restructuring strategies improve performance the most. 
Privatization dramatically increases restructuring likelihood & 
success. Firm privatized for 4 years will increase productivity 3 - 5 
times more than a similar SOE. Little difference in performance 
based on method of privatization, but ownership & financing 
effects impact restructuring.  
Smith, Cin and 
Vodopivec 
(1997) 
Using a sample wi th 22,735 firm - years of data drawn from 
period of “spontaneous privatization” in Slovenia (1989-1992), 
examine the impact of foreign and employee ownership on firm 
performance. 
Document that a percentage point increase in foreign ownership is 
associated wi th a 3.9% increase in value - added, and for employee 
ownership with a 1.4% increase. Also find that firms with higher 
revenues, profits, and exports are more likely to exhibit foreign and 
employee ownership.  
Dyck (1997)  Develops and tests an adverse selection model to explain the 
Treuhand’s role in restructuring and privatizing eastern 
Germany’s state- owned firms. In less than five years, the 
Treuhand privatized more than 13,800 firms and parts of firms 
and, uniquely, had the resources to pay for restructu ring itself—
but almost never chose to do so. Instead, it emphasized speed 
Documents that privatized east German firms were much more 
likely to have transferred western (usually German) managers into 
key positions  than were companies that remained state- owned. 
Also finds that Treuhand emphasized sales open to all buyers 
rather than favoring eastern Germans. Principal message: 
privatization  programs must carefully consider when and how to  
 
and sales to existing western firms over giveaways and sales to 
capital funds. Paper rationalizes Treuhand’s approach.  
affect managerial replacement in privatized companies. Plans open 
to western buyers and which allow management change are most 





Compares the performance of privatized and state- owned firms 
in the transition economies of Central Europe, and asks the 
question “when does privatization work?” Examines influence 
of ownership structure on performance using a sample of 90 
state- owned an d 128 privatized companies in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Employs panel data regression 
methods to isolate ownership effects. 
Privatization “works,” but only when firm is controlled by outside  
owners (other than managers or employees). Privati zation adds 
over 18 percentage points to the annual growth rate of a firm sold 
to a domestic financial company, and 12 percentage points when 
sold to a foreign buyer. Privatization to an outside owner also adds 
about 9 percentage points to productivity growth. Further, gain 
does not come at the expense of higher unemployment; insider 
controlled firms are much less likely to restructure, but outsider-
controlled firms grow faster. Shows the importance of 
entrepreneurship in reviving sales growth.  
Weiss and N ikitin 
(1999) 
Perform econometric analysis of the effects of ownership by 
investment funds on the performance of 125 privatized Czech 
firms during the period 1993- 1995. Assess these effects by 
measuring the relationship between  changes in performance 
and changes in the composition of ownership at the start of the 
privatization period. Use robust estimation techniques, in 
addition to OLS, since data strongly reject normality.  
Find that ownership concentration and composition jointly affect 
performance of privatized firms. Concentration of ownership in the 
hands of a large shareholder, other than an investment fund or 
company, is associated with significant performance improvements 
(for all measures of performance). Concentrated ownership by 
funds did not imp rove firm performance. Preliminary post- 1996 
data suggests that changes in investment fund legislation may 
improve their performance. 
Claessens and 
Djankov (1999a) 
Study the effect of management turnover on changes in financial 
and operating performance o f 706 privatized Czech firms over 
the period 1993- 1997. Examine changes in profitability and 
labor productivity.  
Find that the appointment of new managers is associated with 
significant improvements in profit margins and labor productivity, 
particularly if the managers are selected by private owners. New 
managers appointed by the National Property Fund also improve 
performance, though not by as much.  
Claessens and 
Djankov (1999b)  
Examine the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate performance for 706 privatized Czech firms during 
the period 1992 - 1997. Use profitability and labor productivity 
Finds that concentrated ownership is associated with higher 
profitability and labor productivity. Also find t hat foreign strategic 
owners and non - bank - sponsored investment funds improve  
 





Examines whether the imposition of hard budget constraints is 
alone sufficient to improve  corporate performance in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Employs a sample of 216 firms, 
split between state- owned (31%), privatized (43%), and 
private (26%) firms. 
Finds privatization alone added nearly 10 percentage points to the 
revenue growth o f a firm sold to outside owners. Most 
importantly, finds that the threat of hard budget constraints for 
poorly- performing SOEs falters, since governments are unwilling 
to allow these firms to fail. The brunt of SOEs’ lower 
creditworthiness falls on state creditors. 
Frydman,  Hessel 
and Rapaczynski 
(2000) 
Examines whether privatized Central European firms controlled 
by outside investors are more entrepreneurial —in terms of 
ability to increase revenues—than firms controlled by insiders 
or the state. Study em ploys survey data from a sample of 506 
manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. 
Documents that all state and privatized firms engage in similar 
types of restructuring, but that product restructuring by firms 
owned by outside investors is significantly more effective, in terms 
of revenue generation, than by firms with other types of ownership. 
Concludes the more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider- owned 
firms is due to incentive effects, rather than human capital effects, 
of privatization —specifically greater readiness to take risks. 
Harper (2000)  Examines the effects of privatization on the financial and 
operating performance of 174 firms privatized in the first—and 
380 firms divested in the second —wave of the Czech 
Republic’s voucher privatizations of 1992 and 1994. 
Compares results for privatized firms to those which remain 
state- owned. Employs Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh 
methodology and variables to measure changes. 
Finds that the first wave of privatization yielded disappoi nting 
results. Real sales, profitability, efficiency and employment all 
declined dramatically (and significantly). However, second wave 
firms experienced significant increases in efficiency and profitability 
and the decline in employment —though still significant —was much 
less drastic than after first wave (- 17% vs - 41%).    
 
Table 7: Summary of Empirical Studies of Privatization in Transition Economies: Russia and Former Soviet Republics  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 





Surveys 452 Russian shops sold during the early- 1990s to 
measure the importance of alternative channels through which 
privatization promotes restructuring.  
Document that presence of new owners and managers raises the 
likelihood of value - increasing restructuring. Finds equity incentives 
do not improve performance; instead points to importance of new 
human capital in economic transformation.  
Earle (1998)  Investigates the impact of ownership structure on the (labor) 
productivity of Russian industrial firms. Using 1994 survey data, 
examines differential impact of insider, outsider, or state 
ownership on the performance of 430 firms --of which 86 
remained 100% state- owned, 299 w ere partially privatized, 
and 45 were newly- created. Adjusts empirical methods to 
account for tendency of insiders to claim dominant ownership in 
the best firms being divested. 
OLS regressions show a positive impact of private (relative to 
state) share ownership on labor productivity, with this result 
primarily due to managerial ownership. After adjusting for selection 
bias, however, finds that only outsider ownership is significantly 
associated with productivity improvements. Stresses that leaving 
insiders in control of firms —while politically expedient —has very 
negative long- term implications for the restructuring of Russian 
industry.  
Earle and Estrin 
(1998) 
Using a sample very similar to that used by Earle (1998) above, 
examine whether privatization, com petition and the hardening of 
budget constraints play efficiency - enhancing roles in Russia.  
Find a 10 percentage point increase in private share ownership 
raises real sales per employee by 3 - 5%. Subsidies (soft budget 
constraints) reduce the pace of restructuring in state- owned firms, 
but the effect is small and often insignificant. 
Djankov (1999a)  Investigates the relation between ownership structure and 
enterprise restructuring for 960 firms privatized in six newly 
independent states between 1995 and 1997. Employ survey 
data collected by the World Bank in late 1997 from Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. 
Show that foreign ownership is positively associated with 
enterprise restructuring at high ownership levels (>30%), while 
managerial ownership is positively related to restructuring at low 
(<10%) or high  levels, but negative at intermediate levels. 
Employee ownership is beneficial to labor productivity at low 
ownership levels, but is otherwise insignificant. 
Djankov (1999b)   Using same survey data as in Djankov (1999a) above, studies 
effects of different privatization modalities on restructuring 
process in Georgia (92 firms) and Moldova (149 firms). 
Georgia employed voucher privatization, while the majority of 
Moldovan firm s were acquired by investment funds — and 
Privatization through management buy- outs is positively associated 
with enterprise restructuring, while voucher privatized firms do not 
restructure more rapidly than  still state- owned firms. Implies that 
managers who gain ownership for fee may have less incentive to 
restructure, as their income is not solely based on the success of  
 




Surveys the history of privatizati on in Russia. While mostly 
descriptive, several case studies are analyzed. 
Authors conclude that Russian privatization has created a 
“kleptocracy” and has essentially failed. Stresses the importance 
of minimizing incentives for self- dealing in the design o f 
privatization programs.  
 
Table 8: Summary of Empirical Studies Examining Initial Returns to Investors in Share Issue Privatizations  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table summarizes the recent academic studies of privatization that examine the initial (usually first- day) return earned by investors who buy shares in share 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 
Summary of empirical findings and conclusions  
Menyah and 
Paudyal (1996) 
Examine initial and long- term returns for 40 British privatization 
IPOs (PIPOs) and 75 private- sector IPOs on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1991. 
PIPOs offer a market- adjusted initial return of 39.6%, compared 
to private sector IPO initial return of 3.5%. Regression analysis 
explains up to 64% of variation in PIPO initial returns. 
Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1987) 
Test whether privatization IPOs (PIPOs) are more or less 
underpriced than private sector IPOs in 8 countries. Compare 
actual initial returns for 109 companies from Canada, France, 
Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Thailand and the UK with 
national average initial returns reported in Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994). 
Finds mixed reesults. Initial returns to privatization issues are higher 
than to private sector IPOs in unregulated industries and in the 
UK. Privatization IPOs are lower than private offers in Canada 
and Malaysia, and they conclude there is not a systematic 
tendency to underprice PIPOs on the part of all governments. 
Huang and 
Levich (1998) 
Study offering terms and initial returns to investors in 507 
privatization share offerings from 39 count ries during 1979-
1996, and test alternative explanations for the observed 
underpricing.  
Document average initial returns of 32.2% for PIPOs and 7.17% 
for seasoned privatization offerings. Also find that SIPs from non -
OECD countries are more underpriced th an OECD offers, but 





Examine initial and long- tern returns offered to investors in 18 
PIPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia from 1984-
1995. Also provide details of offering terms and share 
allocation patterns. 
Malaysia PIPOs offer market- adjusted initial returns of 103.5% 
(median 79.9%), which is significantly greater than the private 





Examine how political and economic factors influence initial 
returns, as well as share and control allocation patterns, for a 
sample of 630 SIPs from 59 countries during 1977- 1997.  
Document that governments deliberately und erprice both PIPOs 
(mean 34.1%, median 12.4%) and seasoned SIPs (9.4& and 
3.3%). Also find that share and control allocation patterns are best 
explained by political factors. Support predictions of Biais & 
Perotti (1999) theoretical model.  
Su and Fleisher   Study the cross - sectional pattern of underpricing of 308  Document massive underpricing, with an average initial return of  
 
(1999)  Chinese PIPOs from 1987- 1995. Tests whether observed 
underpricing can be explained using a signalling model.  
940%. Interpret f indings as consistent with a signalling model, 
since 91% of all firms subsequently execute seasoned equity 
offerings. 
Jelic and Briston 
(2000a) 
Examine initial and long- term returns for 25 PIPOs and 24 
other IPOs in Hungary during 1990- 1998. 
Finds PIPOs a re much larger and have higher market- adjusted 
initial returns than other IPOs (44% mean and 9% median vs 40% 
and 5%, respectively), but the return differences are not significant.   
Jelic and Briston 
(2000b) 
Examine initial and long- term returns for 55 PIPOs and 110 
other IPOs in Poland during 1990- 1998. 
Using first- day opening prices (not offer prices), find small, though 
significantly positive, mean abnormal initial returns (1.16%) for 
PIPOs and insignificant mean abnormal initial returns (0.22%) for 
oth er IPOs. The difference is insignificant.  
Ausenegg (2000)  Examine initial and long- term returns for 52 PIPOs and 107 
other IPOs in Poland during 1990- 1998. 
Documents significantly positive initial abnormal return for 
PIPOs (60.4% mean, 19.8% median) and  for other IPOs 
(19.8% and 12.9%), though difference is insignificant. 
Without Bank Slaski, mean PIPO initial return cut roughly 
in half.  
Choi and Nam 
(2000) 
Compares initial returns of 185 PIPOs form 30 countries during 
1981- 1997 to those of private sector IPOs from the same 
countries using mean national initial returns reported in 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). 
Finds there is a general tendency for PIPOs to be more 
underpriced than private sector IPOs (mean of 31% 
versus 24.6%), and that the degree of underpricing for 
PIPOs is positively related to the stake sold and to the 





Analyze both direct and indirect costs (associated with 
underpricing)  of 2,051 IPOs, including 185 PIPOs, in 61 non -
US markets during the period 1992- 99. Primarily a private-
sector, underwriting study.  
Document that PIPOs are significantly more underpriced 
(by about 9 percentage points) than are private- sector 
IPOs, and the  underwriter spreads are a significant 61 
basis points lower.  
 
Table 9: Summary of Empirical Studies Examining Long -Run Returns to Investors in Share Issue Privatizations  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table summarizes the empirical findings of several recent academic studies of share issue privatization (SIPs) that examine the long- run (1- 5 year) retur ns 





Sample description, study period, and methodology 
 
Summary of empirical findings and conclusions  
Levis (1993)  Examines long- run return to 806 British IPOs from 1980-1988. 
Sample includes 12 PIPOs, accounting for 76% of total IPO 
value. 
While private sector IPOs under- performed the market by over 





Examine long- run (one - year) returns for Latin American IPOs, 
including 9 Chilean PIPOs from 1982- 1990.  
Using returns from offer price, finds significantly negative one - year 
market- adjusted returns for PIPOs averaging  –29.9% (median –




Examine initial and long- term returns for 40 British PIPOs and 
75 private sector IPOs executed on the London Stock 
Exchange between 1981 and 1991. 
Document significant positive 33% market- adjusted 400- day (80 
week) r eturn for PIPO versus an insignificant 3.5% return for 
private sector IPOs. 
Davidson (1998)  Studies 1,3,5, and 10- year market adjusted returns for SIPs 
from five European countries (Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and 
the UK) through March 1997. 
After long period of under- performance, averaging 1 - 1.5% per 
year, finds SIPs out - performed European market averages during 
previous 12 months.  
Foerster and 
Karolyi (1998) 
Examines long- run return for 333 non - US companies that list 
stock on US markets in the form  of ADRs.from 1982- 1996. 
Compare returns for 77 SIPs (38 IPOs, 39 seasoned offers) 
with private offers.  
Document insignificantly positive 4.1% 3 - year abnormal returns for 
SIPs compared to (insignificantly) negative returns of  –1.7% for 




Examine initial and long- tern returns offered to investors in 18 
PIPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia from 1984-
1995. Also provide details of offering terms and share 
allocation patterns. 
Find that both PIPOs and pri vate sector IPOs yield normal returns 
(insignificantly different from overall market) over 1,3, and 5 - year 
holding periods. 
Boubakri and  Evaluates the long - term returns to investors in 120 SIPs from  Find significant 3 - year raw returns (112% mean, 30% median),  
 
Cosset (2000)  26 developing countries during 1982- 1995.  but insignificant mean (37- 46%) and median ( - 7% to 13%) 
market- adjusted returns —due to weighting of SIPs in stock 
market indices.  Significant positive long- run returns after adjusting 
for impact of SIP size on index.  
Jelic and Briston 
(2000) 
Examine initial and long- term returns for 25 PIPOs and 24 
other IPOs in Hungary during 1990- 1998. 
Finds PIPOs yield insignificantly positive market- adjusted returns 
over 1,2, and 3 - year holding periods, reaching a peak of 21.3% in 
month 15, while private- sector IPOs yield significantly negative 
returns.  
Jelic and Briston 
(2000b) 
Examine initial and long- term returns for 55 PIPOs and 110 
other IPOs in Poland during 1990- 1998. 
PIPO investors earn significantl y positive 1,3, and 5 - year market 
adjusted returns, while other IPO investors earn negative returns. 
The difference is significant for most holding periods.  
Ausenegg (2000)  Examine initial and long- term returns for 52 PIPOs and 107 
other IPOs in Poland during 1990- 1999. 
Finds both PIPO and private- sector IPO investors earn 
negative —often significant —abnormal returns over 1,3, and 5 year 
holding periods.  
Perotti and Oijen 
(2000) 
Develop a theoretical model suggesting that long- run returns to 
investors in developing- country SIPs will earn excess returns if 
and when political risk is resolved. Test the model using data 
from 22 countries with active privatization programs during 
1988- 1995. 
First document that their proxy for political risk declines by an 
annual average of 3.6% during the course of a privatization 
program, and that stock markets develop very rapidly. The decline 
in risk leads to positive excess returns for SIPs of about 6% per 
year. 
Choi, Nam and 
Ryu (2000) 
Compute buy- and - hold returns of 204 PIPOs from 37 
countries during 1977- 1997. 
Find significantly positive market- adjusted returns to SIPs over 1, 
3, and 5- year holding periods. 
Megginson, 
Nash, Netter and 
Schwartz (2000) 
Examine long- run (1,3, and 5 - year) returns for 158 PIPOs 
from 33 countries from 1981- 1997. Compute local - currency 
and $ returns, versus national and international indices, and 
versus matching firms. 
Document economically and statistically positive holding- period 
returns in both local currency and $, and versus all market indices. 




Examine long- run returns to investors in 102 SIPs from 
developed and developing countries over 1981- 1994. Also 
examine long- run stock return performa nce of privatized firms 
and compare the relative performance of a large sample (1,500 
Document significantly positive long- term (1- 5 years) abnormal 
stock returns, mostly concentrated in Hungary, Poland, and the 
UK.  
 
and compare the relative performance of a large sample (1,500 
firm - years) of state and privately- owned firms during 1975, 
1985, and 1995.  
Boardman and 
Laurin (2000) 
Examines the factors that influence the long- run returns of 99 
SIPs from 1980- 1995. Test the effect of relative size, fraction 
retained (by government), the presence of a golden share, initia l 
return, and timing on 3 - year buy- and - hold returns. Also 
examines whether UK utility SIPs earned “excessive” returns. 
Find significant positive abnormal returns to all SIPs over one 
(9.2%), two (13.5%) and three- year (37.4%) holding periods. 
British SIPs are higher than non - UK issues, and UK utilities have 
highest returns (60.6% 3 - year excess returns), but 3 - year non -UK 
SIP returns also significant. Excess returns are (significantly) 
positively related to fraction retained and initial period return, and 
are negatively related to relative size and presence of a golden 
share.  
 
Table  10: The Growth of Wor ld Stock Market Capitalization and Trading Volume, 1983-1999 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table details the growth in the ag gregate market capitalization and trading volume, in $US millions, over the 16- year period 1983- 1999.  Market capitalization 
figures are year- end values, translated from local currencies into US$ at the contemporaneous exchange rate, while trading volumes  represent the total value of all 
trades executed during the year. Data sources: 1983- 1998, the World Bank’s  Emerging Markets Fact Book  (various issues); 1999 data from the Statistics section 
of the Federation of International Stock Exchange’s website (www.fibv.com) , but comparable to World Bank data.   
Market Capitalization   1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  1999 
    Developed Countries  3,301,117  6,378,234  10,957,463  9,921,841  15,842,152  24,530,692  32,820,474 
        United States  1,898,063  2,636,598  3,505,686  4,485,040  6,857,622  12,926,177  16,642,462 
        Japan   565,164  1,841,785  4,392,597  2,399,004  3,667,292  2,495,757  4,554,886 
        United Kingdom   225,800  439,500  826,598  927,129  1,407,737  2,372,738  2,855,351 
    Deve loping Countries  83,222  135,056  755,210  1,000,014  1,939,919  1,908,258  2,184,899 
    Total World  3,384,339  6,513,290  11,712,673  10,921,855  17,782,071  26,519,773
    35,005,373 
        World, ex. US   1,486,276  3,876,692  8,206,987  6,436,815  10,924,449  13,593,596  18,362,911 
        US as % of World   56.1%  40.5%  29.9%  41.1%  38.6%  48.7%  47.5% 
Trading Volume                
    Developed Countries  1,202,546  3,495,708  6,297,069  4,151,573  9,169,761  20,917,462  35,187,632 
        United States  797,123  1,795,998  2,015,544  2,081,658  5,108,591  13,148,480  19,993,439 
        Japan   230,906  1,145,615  2,800,695  635,261  1,231,552  948,522  1,891,654 
        United Kingdom   42,544  132,912  320,268  382,996  510,131  1,167,382  3,399,381 
    Developing Countries  25,215  77,972  1,170,928  631,277  1,046,546  1,956,858  2,320,891 
    Total World  1,227,761  3,573,680  7,467,997  4,782,850  10,216,307  22,874,320  37,508,523 
        World, ex. US   430,638  1,777,682  5,452,453  2,701,192  5,107,716  9,725,840  17,515,084 
        US as % of World   64.9%  50.3%  27.0%  43.5%  50.0%  57.5%  53.3%  
 
Table 11: Market Values of the Largest Publicly-Traded Privatized Firms  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Stock market value, total sales, and total profits--in millions of US dollars (translated at the contemporaneous exchange 
rate)--of the 25 publicly- traded privatized firms worth at least US $18 billion as of May 31, 1999. Data are from 
Morgan Stanley Capital International, as reported in “The Business Week Global 1000,” Business Week  (July 12, 
1999). Global 1000 Rank refers to the company’s global ranking based on market valuation, while Country Rank 
refers to its relative position among those firms from their country on the Global 1000 List.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Global          Market    Mkt Value as % 
               1000        Country       Value    of National Mkt  
Company Name      Country               Rank              Rank     US $mil    Capitalization  
BP Amoco       United Kingdom           10      1     173,870      7.30    
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan      13      1     156,770       6.43 
Deutsche Telekom      Germany               23      1     115,023     10.51 
British Telecommunications    United Kingdom           26      2      107,142       4.51 
NTT DoCoMo      Japan                  27      2     106,140      4.35 
France Telecom      France                43      1       79,925      8.15   
Telecom Italia        Italy                 58      1       66,446    11.76   
T elstra        Australia        62      1       63,890    19.40 
Telefonica       Spain                 80      1       51,150    14.75 
ING Groep       Netherlands      81      2       50,763      8.43 
ENI          Italy                 83      2       50,483      8.94 
TIM (Telecom Italia Mobiliare) Italy        95      3       43,839      7.76 
Elf Acquitaine        France              106      5       39,340      4.01 
Telefonos de Mexico     Mexico    126
 a       1       33,305    36.30 
Total Fina        France            141      8        30,199      3.08 
Cable & Wireless     United Kingdom       145    14           29,593      1.25 
VEBA        Germany           154      9       28,629      2.62 
Hong Kong Telecommunicatns  Hong Kong               164       2       27,600      8.03 
Swisscom        Switzerland     170      8       26,659      3.87 
Volkswagen        Germany    173    11       26,276      2.40 
Singapore Telecommunications  Singapore           187        1        25,446    15.80 
China Telecom    China   182
a        1        25,294      7.36
b 
Gazprom        Russia      191
 a       1       24,502       ---- 
National Australia Bank    Australia     190      3       24,287      7.38 
Unicredito Italiano      Italy      194      5       23,255      4.12 
Koninklijke KPN     Netherlands           201      7       22,711      3.77 
East Japan Railways      Japan       215    18       21,676      0.89 
Endesa        Spain             230      4        20,432      5.89 
Japan Tobacco      Japan       235    21       20,034      0.82 
Korea Electric Power     Korea     241
 a        1       19,752    17.23 
San Paolo - IMI      Italy         251      6       19,129      3.39 
NTT Data       Japan       255    25       18.908      0.77  
 
Societe Generale      France            261    14       18,734      1.91 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
a These firms are from a companion “Top 200 Emerging- Market Companies” ranking in the same Business Week  
issue, and they are given the rankings they would have if this list was included in the Global 1000 List. 
b  Expressed as a percentage of the Hong Kong market’s total capitalization .   
 
Table 12: Details of the World’s Largest Share Offerings  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This table presents offering details of the 35 largest share offerings in history (those raising over $5 billion) as of  
August 15, 2000. The 10 largest (and 30 of t he 35 total) issues are offerings of shares in privatized firms. Offers are 
reported in nominal amounts (not inflation - adjusted), and are translated into millions of US dollars ($mil) using the 
contemporaneous exchange rate.  Private -sector offerings are presented in bold - face, italicized type, while share 
issue privatizations (SIPs) are presented in normal typeface. An initial public offering is indicated as an IPO, while a 
seasoned equity offers is designated an SEO. Amounts reported for SIP offers are as described in the  Financial 
Times at the time of the issue. Private- sector offering amounts are from the Securities Data Corporation file.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Date    Company        Country   Amount ($mil)       IPO/SEO  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nov 87  Nippon Telegraph & Telephone   Japan         $40,260    SEO  
Oct 88  Nippon Telegraph & Telepho ne   Japan           22,400    SEO  
Nov 99  ENEL         Italy          18,900    IPO 
Oct 98  NTT DoCoMo       Japan           18,000    IPO 
Oct 97  Telecom Italia         Italy          15,500    SEO  
Feb 87  Nippon Telegraph & Telephone   Japan           15,097
    IPO 
Nov 99  Nippon Telegraph & T elephone   Japan           15,000    SEO  
Jun 00   Deutsche Telekom       Germany        14,760    SEO  
Nov 96  Deutsche Telekom       Germany        13,300    IPO 
Oct 87  British Petroleum      United Kingdom   12,430    SEO  
Apr 00  ATT Wireless (tracking stock)  United States       10,600    IPO 
Nov 98  France Telecom       France         10,500    SEO  
Nov 97  Telstra         Australia         10,530    IPO 
Oct 99  Telstra         Australia         10,400    SEO  
Jun 99   Deutsche Telekom       Germany        10,200    SEO  
Dec 90  Regional Electricity Companies
a  United Kingdom     9,995    IPO 
Dec 91  British Telecom        United Kingdom     9,927    SEO  
Jun 00   Telia           Sweden         8,800    IPO 
Dec 89  U.K. Water Authorities
a    United Kingdom     8,679    IPO 
Dec 86  British Gas        United Kingdom     8,012    IPO 
Jun 98   Endesa         Spain          8,000    SEO
 
Jul 97    ENI           Italy          7,800    SEO  
Apr 00  Oracle Japan       Japan         7,500    IPO 
Jul 93    British Telecom        U.K.          7,360    SEO  
Oct 93  Japan Railroad East      Japan           7,312    IPO 
Dec 98  Nippon Telegraph & T elephone   Japan           7,300    SEO  
Oct 97  France Telecom       France         7,080     IPO 
Jul 99    Credit Lyonnais       France         6,960    IPO 
Feb 94  Elf Acquitaine         France                   6,823    SEO  
Jun 97  Halifax Building Society     United Kingdom  6,813    IPO 
Jun 98   ENI           Italy          6,740    SEO  
May 94  Autoliv Sverige      Sweden        5,818    IPO 
Oct 96  ENI           Italy          5,864    SEO   
 
Oct 98  Swisscom         Switzerland         5,600    IPO 
Jul 99  United Parcel Service    USA            5,500    IPO 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
a  Indicates a group offering of multiple companies that trade separately after the IPO.  
 
Figure 3: Changes in the Number of Shareholders in Privatized Firms Over Years +1 to +6 
 
This figure represents the dynamics of share ownership of a sample of privatized firms, where the number of shareholders in Year 0 is normalized to 1 and 
in subsequent years shows the change with respect to Year 0. The companies with less than 100,000 initial shareholders exhibit increasing numbers of 
shareholders, and the companies with more tha n 100,000, more than 250,000 and more than 500,000 initial shareholders exhibit strong declines that pull 
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